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The Teaching of Jurisprudence
American Law Schools

Anthony

Dean Morris asked

me

to

Committee

the

of jurisprudence in American

some

one

of my ideas about

extreme, the

theory

well. However, the topic Dean Morris pro
posed to me-the teaching of jurisprudence in

pretation, I

ples that inform
dence" of

just plain silly. I

am sure

should like
raise

one

sufficiently
interesting

to
or

make
two

one or

two

points-or rather

questions-that

serious to warrant, and
to

reward,

a

I think

are

sufficiently

few moments of reflec

tion.

thing we must do is fix our terms.
Jurisprudence is an elastic word, which is easily
stretched to cover a host of different things. At
The first

*Assistant

Professor of

Law. Address given

on

November 18, 1976, to members of the Univer
sity of Chicago Law School Visiting Committee.

or

particular substantive area of
we speak of thel "jurispru

taxation. Constitutional inter

suppose, is

,

somewhere in the middle.

today

I shall

refer to

use

the term

branch of

"jurisprudence"
philoso
phy. I have in mind the sort of thing that tradi
tionally has been taught in the jurisprudence
course offered by most American law schools.
Although the content of such a course naturally
depends upon the instructor's interests, there are
certain core questions that are almost always in
cluded on its agenda. Among them, I would list
the following four: (1) What is a legal system, and
what are the materials of which it is composed?
(2) What is the nature oflegal obligation, and how
to

that you

of.anxiety on my part.
Although this clearly is neither the time nor the
place for a sober dissertation on the role of juris
prudence in our system of legal education, I

torts

In my remarks

legal education-is a
high-risk topic. In speaking on it even for a short
time, one runs the risk of being overly simple or
or

a

the law-as when

American system of

pretentious

more

treme, it is sometimes used to describe any in
vestigation or description of the guiding princi

as

will understand when I tell you that the prospect
of today's talk has produced a moderate amount

legal

perhaps
generally, with
At
the other ex
political philosophy.

or,

teaching
legal
education, my reaction was a mixed one. To be
invited to speculate on such a large and compli
Gated topic was of course very flattering
especially for a junior faculty member who is
new not only to the Law School but to law teach

our

term is synonymous with
even

moral and

ing

3

T. Kronman *

share with the

When
Visiting

•

In

does it differ from

or

a

resemble other forms of

obligation-in particular, moral obligation? (3)
Must the law be just? Or, more cynically, can it
be? (4) What are the properties oflegal argument,
and how does the interpretive use of precedent
by lawyer and judge differ from other kinds of
interpretation-for example, from those which a
physicist brings to bear on the results of his ex
periment, or a literary critic on his text, or a
psychoanalyst on his patient?
This is

questions

a

formidable list of questions. But the
by no means of interest only to

are

teachers of jurisprudence. In

one

way

or

another,

they work

themselves with

regularity

into

our

substantive law courses-into contracts and torts

and taxation and administrative and criminal and
constitutional law. It is a rare law school class

4

jurisprudence in it. Like Moliere's
prose-speaking gentleman, we are doing juris
that has

no

prudence all the time. I hasten to add that the
comparison is not really apt, since I suspect that
my

colleagues

are

fully

aware

of what they're up

to.

everywhere in the law cur
riculum. I cannot imagine, for example, teaching
the doctrine of promissory estoppel to my con
is

Jurisprudence

tracts

class,

or

exploring with them the

notions

of

duress and unconscionability, without talking
about the relation between legal and moral obli

gation. The concepts of fault and causation in tort
law, the notoriously difficult problem of criminal

punishment, the
a

use

of the

tax

just distribution of wealth,

to

achieve

system
the constitutional

right to freedom of
judicially implied right to pri

conflict between the express

speech and the

and abuse of

the idea of ownership, the use
precedent in every field of the law-all these
vacy,

jurisprudential issues, or more precisely
constitute jurisprudential issues, since they can
not be "got at" without doing some philosophy.
The jurisprudence course, then, has no
monopoly on jurisprudential questions. But, if
raise

4(

this is so, it is

difficult to

more

jurisprudence off as

a

see

what marks

special discipline: and

un

know what sets it apart, it is quite im
possible to describe its place in the law cur

less

we

have difficulty identifying what
jurisprudence is all about, I think it is because we
expect it to have a substantively distinct subject
riculum. If

matter

we

of its

bankruptcy

or

(like federal taxation or
civil procedure). This expectation,
own

however, is a misleading one: what distinguishes
jurisprudence as an enterprise is not so much the
questions that it asks

as

the

way in

which it asks

them. Questions about law and morality and the
nature of a legal system and the function of prec

edent arise routinely in every course in the cur
riculum. But in the jurisprudence course they are

peculiarly abstract way. It is the
abstractness of jurisprudence that sets it apart.
The single most striking fact about the teaching
of jurisprudence in American law schools is that
it is typically not taught by the so-called case
treated in

method. Most jurisprudence courses are taught
from texts, from books and articles, and if a case
comes

in

and then, it is by way of illustra
an idea and perhaps give it

now

to embroider

tion,

added poignancy. But it is not the cases that
important, and few jurisprudence teachers

some
are

subject can be taught best or
economically by the case method. J urispru
dence is a branch of philosophy, and at least
since Plato the advocates and practitioners of phi

would argue that the
most

losophy have instructed us to direct our attention
to principles rather than particulars. Of course, to
paraphrase a very famous remark of Kant' s, if par
ticulars without principles are blind, principles
without particulars are empty. In legal education
the particulars are the cases or, more precisely,
the cases and the materials that today customarily
them.

accompany

we do not serve up the particulars
but
attempt to give them some coher
blindly,
ence and meaning by drawing out their princi
often at a length exasperating to teacher and

Of

course

ples,

courses taught by the
case or statutory
particular
method,
the
important thing.
provision that is ultimately
Although a teacher of jurisprudence may be un

student alike. But in the
it is the

case

able to do without

an

occasional

case

or

two to

illustrate his point, it is the

conceptual proposi
it
tion (whatever
might be) that he regards as
interesting and important. In the jurisprudence
one has an opportunity to linger at a level
of abstraction which, if reached in other courses,
must be abandoned almost as soon as it is at

course,

tained. What
our

place

we

law curriculum will

in

assign jurisprudence

depend

upon the role

we

play

in

legal

ought

to

be

think this kind of abstraction should
education.
I

happen

to think that the role

rather substantial one, and
tive

things

one

of the

about the University of

a

most attrac

Chicago

Law

School-from my vantage point-is that this view
is widely shared among the faculty. There is,

however,

a

traditional argument for suppressing
legal education. I should like to say

abstraction in
a

word

or

two

about it.

It is often said that

a

a

legal

one

education at

that it dissolves the

an

of the great strengths of
American law school is

misplaced optimism that

most undergraduates tend to have concerning the
to this, I think.
power of ideas. There is much

The students in my contracts class are very good
what
at handling abstractions. This is precisely

prepared them
handling cases. I am

their undergraduate training has

6

to

do. They

are

less

good

to

be

at

but it

seems

to

me

overgeneralizing,
that my first-year students find it very easy to
state the principle of a case and very difficult to
as applied to that particu
say what the principle,
of
set
lar
facts, actually means or may be said to
sure,

stand for. The Socratic method of interrogation is
intended to repair this deficiency. Under Socratic
the student is disciplined to think about the

fire,

facts and is made to see,

Professor Corbin often

as

remarked, that it is the facts that
important-not the rules of law.

are

all

(or her)

else

one

rubbed in the facts: everything

nose

does in law school depends on it. This is
a painful experience for the student

often both

exhilarating one. It is painful and
exhilarating for the same reason: the facts are
something new, at best only rarely encountered
in one's undergraduate years. Undergraduate
education is primarily theoretical. Even a very
successful undergraduate, who is comfortable
and

an

and competent with theoretical questions, is
likely to lack a feel for the facts. This requires

something
legal
in
intelligence
judgment:
training

good judgment, and judgment
altogether
is

only the

is

different from intelligence. A

education is

a

raw

material

said that

sometimes

which it works. So it is
of our main tasks, as law

on

one

teachers, should be to discourage abstraction (or
at least philosophical abstraction), to continually
insist upon the limits rather than the power of

ideas, because only

in this way will

our

students

be led to abandon their adolescent enthusiasm
and to become men and women of
for

thinking
good judgment.
Although I have overstated this
to criticize

it, it does point

strengths of the

case

to

view in order

one

of the great

method of instruction. An

good part a train
if
it
is
tempered with an
ing in skepticism, and,
appreciation of the importance of ideas (not just

American

in the

legal

education is in

law, and

human life

not

just

as

instruments, but in

generally and for

such skepticism is

a

their

philosopher friends,

with

that

pointed

a

is often the most economical way to

hypothetical
make a point or to deflate one. Lawyers, on the
whole, are no smarter than philosophers, but
their case-hardened caution about ideas makes
them slower to accept an abstraction that hasn't

baptized by the facts. This is often infuriat
ing to philosophers, but the lawyer's propensity
to test the reach of an idea with cases not only is a
healthy counterweight to what might be called
the exuberance of thinking-it also makes him a
formidable opponent in any philosophical argu

been

ment.

This sensitivity to the facts is something that
of
must be learned or acquired in the first year
have
must
student
law
law school. The beginning
his

indispensable-aid to clear thinking. I have
found in my own experience, in conversations

own

sake),

powerful-indeed,

an

This is the positive side of the case method.
There is, however, a negative side as well. The
case

method is

designed

to erode

the student's

naive confidence in the power of ideas

by keep

ing constantly before his eyes the difficult bor
derline case that strains principled distinctions to
the breaking point. Undoubtedly this is a painful
experience for many students, since it strikes at
the heart of their intellectual self-confidence, and
the temptation is great to combat the pain by de

nying that ideas have

any power in

their

own

counters in the

right, apart from their use as
struggles of practical life. No one is more likely to
feel the seductive appeal of this kind of anti
intellectualism than a harried first-year law stu
dent who has been Socratically battered from pil
lar to post. In fact, once they have discovered the
trick, most law students (or at least the best ones)
appropriate the Socratic engine for their own
one
purposes and begin ruthlessly grinding
another down in a kind of mock combat in which

anticipate what it will be like to think
and act like a lawyer. All this is perfectly under
standable: it is part of learning the craft. But as

they try

to

Karl Llewellyn noted in the Bramble Bush, the
line between skepticism and cynicism is a thin
sensi
one. We want to teach our students to be
tive to the limits of ideas

so

that

they

may prac

we must
responsibly.
that
conviction
the
thinking
smug
guard against
of
kind
a
pale re
is a luxury, a self-indulgence,
flection of the robustness of practical life. Most of

tice law

At the

same

time,

students, when they come to us, are in
fatuated with theory. And by and large they are
abstract thinking
very good at theory because
our

does not require experience. For them, the first
disenchantment. But when
year of law school is a
and un
we have taught our students how fragile

help them
in the
old
their
of
confidence
to regain something
restor
This
of
thinking.
power and importance
ative task is, if anything, more difficult than the

sure

any abstraction

destructive
want

our

one.

really is,

But it is

we

just

must

as

important:

want them to be

intellectually

we

we

also

mature men

and

students to be able lawyers, but

that
women. It is a sign of intellectual maturity
full aware
one affirms the value of thinking in
ness

of its limitations.

provides a forum in which abstrac
encouraged, the jurisprudence course

Because it
tion is

important restorative role in our law cur
riculum. To be sure, it is not the only course in

plays

an

legal questions and legal materials are
examined from a purely theoretical standpoint.
One of the extraordinary things about this law

which

school is the number and variety of theoretical
This is
courses and seminars it offers its students.

evidence, I think, of the rather special
ment

that the

intellectual

school, and

fessional

lawyers.

faculty of the

concerns.

But

we are

Of

also

Law School has to

course,

our
an

commit

we

are

a

pro

first task is to train

unusually theoretical

bunch-so much so, in fact, that to many out
siders the Law School looks as much like a re

professional school. I
think this perception is an essentially accurate
nature of the Law
one, and I regard the hybrid
as its greatest strength. It is a great
School

search institute

as

it does

a

obligation

to

give his student what he himself

prizes and has found worthwhile in life.
Why is jurisprudence important to a law

stu

dent? First, I suppose, because it increases his
facility with ideas, making him a better prac
titioner and advocate. When Karl Llewellyn told
his jurisprudence students that the course in
jurisprudence was the most practical bread-and

they would take in law school, I
in mind. Sec
expect he had something like this
ond, the jurisprudence course exposes the stu
dent to a body of ideas-and, more important, of
writings-with which every educated lawyer
should be familiar. There are relatively few clas
sics in jurisprudence, and in my view they should

butter

course

indispensable part of every law student's
education. If familiarity with these few texts does
not in any obvious way sharpen the student's
rhetorical skills, it will certainly broaden his em
form

an

pathetic capacities by exposing him to what Max
Weber called the "polytheism of ultimate
values." If the practice of law requires empathy,
then this is another way-an indirect one-in
which the jurisprudence course is useful to the

practi tione r.
Finally, jurisprudence is important because it

helps the student to discover that thinking is a
pleasure in itself-an activity that men enjoy for
its own sake and not merely because it promotes
some other end. This is an important discovery,
especially for the practitioner, because it helps
'him to recognize that there are many different
excellence may display it
ways in which human
way, the way he has

strength because it is a source of tension; think
to
ing and working here, one is never permitted
lose sight of either the value or the limitations of

chosen, is
but one of these. The same thing should be said,
by the way, for the theory-minded teacher who

abstraction. I suppose this tension is present
wherever the law-which, after all, is a practical

must confront

its tools-is

profession that employs ideas as
taught. But I like to think that the tension is felt
schools.
more acutely here than it is at other law
rather delicious tension; and we are teach
because
ing here, rather than somewhere else,
it. Our one great object as law teachers
we

It is

a

enjoy

should be to

help

our

students experience the

tension themselves. But in order to do so,

we

must undermine their uncritical confidence in
ideas without destroying their native enthusiasm

for theory. Only in this way do we meet what I
think is the basic obligation of every teacher: the

self, and that his

the one-sidedness of his

own

teaching philosophy
recognition is bound to be a humbling

sen

cho

to lawyers. This

way in

one,

re

gardless of whether one's vocation is in the world
it is a pre
or in the university. In either case,
the voca
for
condition to accepting responsibility
tion

one

mean

by

has chosen-and

this,

I

think,

is what

we

freedom.

of the benefits jurisprudence
has for the law student. I should like to conclude
with a word or two about the benefits that juris
These

are

some

prudence has for the law faculty itself. Law
teaching is of course subject to the same pres
of insures of specialization, the same division

7

8

\

tellectuallabor, which
formed

in this century has trans

higher education and produced the mod

American law
statutes

branches of

specialization in law teaching has been slowed
somewhat by the fact that most law teachers
share a common educational background, and by

appreciate,

change

in

T. Kronman

schools, the proliferation of

com

and the emergence of

entirely new
as law and
(such
legal scholarship
it
have
made
increasingly difficult to
economics)

plex

em university, with its atomized faculties and
factory-like atmosphere. Although the process of

the resistance to substantive curricular

Anthony

or even

to assess,

the value of work

being done in a field other than one's own. At
Chicago this difficulty has so far proved not to be
a serious one. The relatively small size of the

its
faculty and the rather remarkable eagerness of
ac
another's
one
abreast
of
members to keep
of
complishments have preserved a wholeness
spirit and understanding that is striking, given

the diversity of their scholarly tasks.
And yet, even here, the risks of specialization
be eliminated altogether. Foremost
these risks is the danger that one may lose

cannot

among

value
sight of the basic assumptions and
in his specialty de
work
which
on
preferences

the fertility of a field requires that
it be turned over regularly, the vitality of a disci
demands that its philosophical under

pends. Just

as

pline

view
pinnings occasionally be exposed to
is
This
scrutinized.
they may be critically
sary if others

cialist is

are

doing

necessary

if the

that

neces

to understand what the spe

and what his aims

are.

specialist himself is

breadth of vision he needs to
in the

so

It is also

to retain the

appreciate his place

larger enterprise of which he

is

a

part.

Jurisprudence-and
much about

a

now

course

as

I

am

talking

about

a

not

mode

so

of

inquiry-provides a forum in which many of
these basic methodological questions may be
raised. It offers the specialist an opportunity to
reflect on the foundations of his specialty and to

his premises and values with those of
his colleagues. In this way it helps him to combat
the terrible tendency of every specialized or
compare

ganization

to turn its members into

the cogs of

a

machine. The simple questions that jurispru
dence poses help us to remain masters of our own
work rather than being mastered by it. In this
sense,

jurisprudence has

But I

am

a

liberating

influence.

afraid you have become suspicious

only praising my own specialty,
and so, perhaps, I am. I hope that my remarks
today have made this concluding burst of en

that

now

thusiasm

I

am

more

understandable.

9

Leviathan

and Education

10

Philip

B. Kurland*

most, if not all, of what I shall have to
say will prove irrelevant to the subject of this
conference. There are several reasons for this

that my experience in the field of education has
been limited to the university level, and the pri

lack of congruity.
The first is that I

teacher whose

Probably

really have nothing to tell you.

The second is that my experience in the area of
school finance is limited to a single foray, some

question of the constitutional
equalize school funds throughout a

years ago, into the

obligation
state.

I

to

in the

was

first, that
certainly

it wasn't

a

vate

Finally,
tell is

at

case.

The Supreme Courts of California

equalize. So far, I think that these states
report only much chaos and little benefit.
The problem with equality, it seems, is that it is
more easily attained by reducing all to the lowest
common denominator than by raising all to the
highest.

tems to
can

The third

reason

I have

so

little to contribute is

I

out

am

Byron's

fresh-interest

to

a

our

betters fail,

twice-told tale;

You may

readily

see,

therefore, why

my

place

this conference is rather that of the court jester
at a council of state: out of the mouths of fools and

at

babes may come-accidentally-some words that
may be transmuted into words of wisdom when

by the catalyst of minds with experience
sophistication.
To fit my talk into the subject of the con
ference, what I shall speak to is a cost of finance.

touched

and

I do not mean, of course, to expatiate

and interest rates. What I do

funds,

even

mean

means

on

bonds

is that the

in these straitened

end in itself. And

not an

taken that the

Kenan, Jr. Distinguished
Professor. This paper was originally presented to
the Conference on Dilemmas in School Finance:
Illinois and the Nation, on February 18, 1977, in
Chicago.

And, if I may quote the
from Horace:

err.

times, is
Service

Hints

And yet, perchance, 'tis wiser to prefer
A hackney'd plot, than choose a new, and

attainment of

*William R.

of joint because all I have to

twice-told tale.

Or lend

that it

and New Jersey-perhaps others-disagreed
with me and have ordered their state school sys

that. Moreover, I am not a
law, but rather a lawyer

is

'Tis hard to venture where

least five of nine of them did in the Ro

driguez

a

words of

was not yet a constitutional mandate.
The Supreme Court of the United States
agreed with me on the constitutional question

or

at

subject

who teaches.

minority then in believing,

good idea, and, second,

university level,

care

should be

and ends of education

are

by the price of the
I
a different audi
before
available.
Were
moneys
ence, I should tell them that my subject is not
not

distorted

or

frustrated

academic freedom but the freedom of the

academy. And

I

apologize

further if what I shall

have

reported

to say is

law, but the

a

about that

more

only

in the context of

of constitutional law. For

context

while I do not know
know

not

lot about that

subject

subject,

I

than about any

other.

Neither academic freedom

academy

nor

fre'edom

of the

is mentioned in the Constitution of the

public education is a late
nineteenth-century growth, and the American
university did not really come into existence
United States. After all,

until the twentieth century was almost upon us.
It would have required greater prescience than
even
the Founding Fathers had to make

adequate provision for these educational

in

stitutions.

Academic freedom, however-the right of fac
ulty to be free from control by government of
their teaching, their research, and their public
utterances-has received

through the

judicial protection

First Amendment of the United

States Constitution. A concurring opinion

by

Mr.

Justice Frankfurter, one of only two Supreme
Court Justices ever to be elevated directly from
the chair to the high court bench, is instructive as
to the reasons for such protection:

democracy ultimately rests on
public opinion is a platitude of speech but
not a commonplace in action. Public opinion
is the ultimate reliance of our society only if
it be disciplined and responsible. It can be
disciplined and responsible only if habits of
open-mindedness and of critical inquiry are
,acquired in the formative years of our citi
zens. The process of education has naturally
enough been the basis of hope for the per
durance of our democracy on the part of all
our great leaders, from Thomas Jefferson
That

our

onwards.
To

regard

teachers-in

our

entire educa

tional system, from the primary grades to the
university-as the priests of our democracy
is therefore not to

indulge

in

hyperbole.

It is

special task of teachers to foster those
habits of open-mindedness and critical in

the

quiry which alone make for responsible
zens, who, in turn, make possible an en
lightened and effective public opinion.
citi

Teachers

must

fulfill their function

by

pre

cept and practice; by the very atmosphere

they generate; they must be exem
plars of open-mindedness and free inquiry.
They cannot carry out their noble task if the
conditions for the practice of a responsible
and critical mind are denied to them. They
must have the freedom of responsible in
quiry, by thought and action, into the mean
ing of social and economic ideas, into the
checkered history of social and economic
dogma. They must be free to sift evanescent
doctrine, qualified by time and circum
stance, from that restless, enduring process
of extending the bounds of understanding
and wisdom, to assure which the freedoms of
thought, of speech, of inquiry, of worship are
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States against infraction by National or State
government. [Wieman v. Updegraff, 344,
U.S. 183, 196-97 (1952)]

which

Thus, academic freedom is thought to be in
corporated into the protection of the Constitution
because it is an essential underpinning for all of
those freedoms that are specified in the First
Amendment.

Then the Justice shifted from freedom of the
to freedom of the academy, which he

academic

an extensive quotation from the
M. Hutchins before a sub
of
Robert
testimony
committee of the House of Representatives. The

concluded with

shift from the

rights of

universities

was

also without

a

an

teachers to the

elision without

a

rights of
halt, but

recognition of any difference:

The functions of educational institutions
in

our

national life and the conditions under

which alone they can adequately perform
them are at the basis of these limitations [i.e.,
the First Amendment limitations] upon State
and National power. These functions and the
essential conditions for their effective dis

charge have been well described by

a

lead

ing educator:

"Now,

a

university is

place that

a

is

established and will function for the ben

efit of society,

provided
independent thought. It
dependent thought and

it is

is

a

a

center

center

of

of in

criticism that is

created in the interest of the progress of
society, and the one reason that we know

that every totalitarian government

must

11

fail is that

prepared

totalitarian government is

no

to

face the

consequences

of

12

"It is important for this purpose to attract
into the institution

pacity, and

men

of the greatest

ca

to encourage them to exercise

their independent judgment.
"A university,

ing Socratic

then,

is

on

the

highest

level for the very best people you can
think of, you can bring together, about the

important questions, and the thing
that you must do to the uttermost possible
limits is to guarantee those men the free

most

[Id.

at

to express themselves."

197-98]

In still another case, we, find Mr.

Frankfurter

the

espousing

Justice

cause

same

of

academic freedom and freedom of the academy
(Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263

[1957]). This time he borrowed from Sir Thomas
Henry Huxley, including a definition of the
essential freedoms necessary to
It is the business of

a

a

university:

university

to

provide

atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which there prevail "the four

that

essential freedoms" of
termine

for itself

on

a

university-to de

grounds who
be taught, how it shall

academic

teach, what may
be taught, and who may be admitted to

may

study.
exam
mean

ing of the Constitution so far as academic free
dom and freedom of the academy are concerned
would be misleading. There is not much in Su
preme Court jurisprudence to specify the proper
realms and limits of this freedom of the

academy.

for this paucity of
is
not hard to find.
it
the
on
subject,
judgments
There would seem to have long been a general
one

seeks

a

reason

acceptance of the concept of freedom of the
academy from governmental infringement which
needed

no

were as

fully protected

as

if

they had

been written into the Constitution. A fifth free
dom, unspecified by Huxley because he spoke

growth of the modern university, the
freedom to determine the subjects of research,

before the

was

equally assured.

understanding, custom as
constitution, protected the academy. In part, the
academy was protected from federal government
In part, the

common

by the recognition that the national
government's limited powers afforded no basis
interference

for federal interference in the academic world.
Until the birth of the service state in the 1930s
and 1940s, the federal role in education was pret
ty much limited to its contributions to land-grant
colleges dating back to the Northwest Ordinance

of 1787.
Two congeries of events

brought the federal

government into the field of education in the
1940s. The first was a change of constitutional

doctrine of no small importance. It may lie within
the memories of some of you that the Supreme
Court of the United States invalidated the New
Deal's AAA program in a decision which an

nounced that the constitutional provision that the
national government could spend money for the

general welfare
spend moneys

was

not an authorization to it to

on

subjects other than those

enumerated in the list of congressional powers in
Article I of the Constitution. The
was

deemed

supplementary

spending

power

to, and not in addi

(United States v.
[1936]). As Robert H.
Butler,
U.,S. 1,
to be, a member of the
soon
but
Jackson-not yet,
Court-wrote: "the original Butler decision,
tion to, the enumerated powers

To suggest, however, that these are but
ples of Supreme Court extrapolation of the

When

study,"

may

...

kind of continu

a

conversation

dom to think and

how it
to

creating free universities.

teach, what may be taught,
shall be taught, and who may be admitted

grounds who

judicial protection because

it

was

not

threatened. Until the Second World War, the

"four essential freedoms" of the academy, stated
by Huxley; "to determine for itself on academic

297
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than any to that date, had turned the
thoughts of men in the (Roosevelt) Administra
tion toward the impending necessity of a chal
more

lenge to the Court" (Jackson, The Struggle for
Judicial Supremacy 139 [1941]).
The Roosevelt court-packing plan came.
Whether or not it succeeded depends on the
measure of success invoked. The proposed stat
defeated, but the New Deal came to have
its way in a vastly changed membership on the
Court. In 1937, in an opinion written for a split
Court by Mr. Justice Cardozo, the Constitution
was revised (Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
ute

was

by academic considerations, and who they
must have in their student bodies, not measured
by academic considerations, among other things.
But I shall go no further down this line, because

[1937]). The day of the service state was
The "general welfare clause" was
us.
upon
established as an independent ground for the
federal spending power which need not be tied
to any specific authority granted to the national
government by the Constitution.
Much later came another change in the Con

sured

stitution. The law came to recognize that there
were rights that might be asserted against the

went about the

u.s. 548

today

we are

concerned with finances, the power

L

'academy by individuals. And the national gov
ernment, through the guise of the Fourteenth
Amendment, began to impose on universities
duties that clearly invaded Huxley's "four free
doms." Universities were, in effect, being told
who they must have on their faculties, not mea-

and

curse

of the

almighty

dollar.

After the Second World War, the government
business of buying up the

academy. And, one can ask, why not? It is an
arm's-length transaction between a willing buyer
and a willing seller. There is no Thirteenth
Amendment to prevent the academy from selling
itself into bondage. There is no Labor Relations
Act to prevent the exercise of economic coercion

by

one on

the other. Professor Edward Shils

re-

13
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cently described the condition of which I speak
(Shils, "Government and the University," Inter
national Council on the Future of the University,
Newsletter, Vol. III, No.5 [December 1976]):
The universities of the United States have
allowed themselves to be

in

placed

a

very

by the federal govern
ment. Always eager to extend the sphere of
their activities, always eager to be of service
to society, they have become dependent on
vulnerable position

the federal government for the conduct of
certain activities which are integral to their

discovery, teaching and training,

program of

in scientific research and in

mainly

training

for the learned professions. They have be
come dependent on the federal government

good intentions on both sides but it has de
veloped into a condition which is inimical to
the long-term interest to both sides. It is
repugnant to the

even

nature

of a contract; it

relationship between sovereign
and subject, between a suitor for largesse

becomes

and

a

a

dispenser of it. There

ration of

must

be

a

resto

balance which renders unto

a

Caesar what is Caesar's and unto under

standing what

is necessary to it.

Having already borrowed at great length from
Professor Shils, as I confessed I should in my
quotation from Hints from Horace, allow me to
afford you a little more of his language, because I
improve

cannot

on

it:

posals promise only transient relief from this
embarrassment; they add to administrative
intellectual
expenses, they are of marginal
interest if of any interest at all, and some of

[T[he government must discontinue its
piecemeal intrusion into the affairs of uni
versities, intruding into the details of admis
sions, appointments, curriculum, etc. These
intrusions are infringements into a sphere of
action which universities can justly claim to
be one in which their traditions, their ex
perience and the record of their judgment
entitles them to autonomy. They are also

into further

fields in which the civil service has little

for funds to such

an

they feel
respond to every
that

extent

themselves constrained to

programmatic proposal of the federal gov
ernment in order to relieve their immediate
financial embarrassment. Many of these pro

bring the

them

universities

the government
them to an end. If the uni

financial difficulties

bring
to help

decides to

once

establish "a

con

versities

are

stitution

of government and university

cording
to

a

own

to the idea of each,"

must

ac

come

better understanding of what is their
"idea." The idea is certainly not the

idea of

being

a

"service station" to the fed

eral government,

do

they

new

not

performing

services which

pay for their actual cost in mone
and which deform the conception

even

tary terms
of the "idea"

by which they should

conduct

themselves.
It

might

wisely or foresightfully.
They are moreover disturbing to the interior
life of universities, they consume a great deal
of time and they are fruitlessly vexatious.
likelihood of acting

The recent intrusions of the federal gov
ernment into

the

making of academic

ernment

with

regard

to

universities, in the

ineptitude of its conception, in its piecemeal
character, in the hostility and harassment
with which it is executed and in the

appear offensive to

counsel

re

prehensively damaging

character of the

com

sanc

threatened against the uni
versities for failure to comply. I think there is

impoverished and the desper
ate who have no unity among themselves in
the face of a monopolistic and often harsh
dispenser of momentary relief from poverty
and desperation. The government as a
monopolist is in a strong position in dealing
with a multitude of separate applicants for its

tions which

support. The existing constitution of gov
ernment and university developed out of

of any of the

straint to the

ap

pointments is too well known to require ex
tended treatment here. It is of a piece with
the rest of the "policy" of the federal gov

no

are

government in the

communist countries

Latin

or

world,
in the

America, Africa

or

even

in the

oligarchies of
Asia, which

threatens the universities of its country with
such large-scale sanctions for infringements
very numerous demands which
are

made of them.

of the

dents will

of the

of training at a foreign medical school and who
had passed the first boards.

us

the national government,
decides that there are too few doc

suppose that

wisdom,
being trained for the good of the

in its
tors

on

moment.

Let

.

upon the commitment

generalities. As always, he
took the high road of principle. Let me take the
low road of example by recounting a specific case
Mr. Shils dwelt

nation. And

let us suppose that the government decides to
afford monetary inducements to students to attend medical schools. And let us suppose that;

recognizing the fact that tuition pays only a small
part of a medical school education, it affords capi
tation grants to medical schools to

help them bear

the cost of training the additional medical stu
dents. The cost to the medical school still, of
course, far exceeds the income from both tuition

university

were

to

versities

conditioned. And let

discovers that

a

us

suppose the government

large number of

Americans in

capable of securing admission to American medi
cal schools decide to go abroad to medical

on

the uni

cogently
including

It is not the conferees' intent, in

ing their medical education

in

foreign medi

cal schools if such persons intend to practice
medicine in the United States. Rather, it is

remedy an unfortunate situation
which currently exists. In the view of the
intended to

conferees, the

current

situation, in which

thousands of U.S. citizens

rolled in

foreign

are

presently

en

medical schools where, in

the education they

most cases,

are

receiving

quality provided by U.S. medical
schools and is being taught in languages
other than English, is a situation which de
is not of the

the immediate attention of the De

serves

partment of Health, Education, and Welfare,
the American Medical Association, and the

the government then decides
that it really is interested not just in more doctors
but in more doctors with particular specialties or
work in specific parts of the country, and the capi
tation grants as well as the scholarships are so

not

this requirement, either to encourage or
condone the practice of U.S. citizens' receiv

suppose

to

succinctly-but

was

stated:

to this

doctors who will commit themselves

qualifica

Moreover, the students to be accepted
not to be chosen by the university but were

tion, and
for the imposition of these students

received.

more

required

not

were

by the Secretary of Health, Educa
Welfare. The reason given by Congress

perhaps not wisely, committed resources not
only for the period of commitment to the pro
posed government subsidies but for the in
definite future. Hospitals, laboratories, and facul
ties are not negotiable paper. A university that
builds them and hires them has a very long-term
commitment on its hands, a commitment which is
in no way compensated by the federal moneys
us

two years

be named

point, the govern
with
the university the cost of
ment has shared
training additional doctors. The university has,

Let

upper-class
completed

standards for residence and academic
tions.

cation.

good. Up

students

to accept all such students, but only those who
met all the university's standards, except the

research and training, expand their facilities
and their faculties to provide the additional edu
so

as

The American universities

as

far,

to accept

American students who had

and capitation grants. But university medical
schools, being dedicated to societal good as well

So

depend

Association of American Medical

Colleges.

And so, until the next time the statute comes up
for renewal, the decision of Congress is that
American universities must make new places

certainly they

are

not

expected

to

displace

stu

dents who have had training in this country and
have met the academic requirements of the
university-for poorly trained students who do
the academic requirements, and who
by the Secretary of Health,

notoriously those where admission
is secured by making large monetary contri
butions. Necessarily their medical training is
primarily in a foreign language.
Let us suppose, finally, that the statute renew

not meet

ing the capitation grants therefore adds still
more condition. The, capitation grants for all

reject them and thereby reject also not merely the
capitation grants for these additional students but

schools,

most

one

stu-

are

to

be selected

Education, and Welfare.
Now, it's

quired

to

true

that the universities

take these students.

They

are

not

are

free to

re

15

the totality of the capitation grants.
The question 1 would address now is whether
the condition in the statute 1 have just described

16

regarded as invalid. My heart, as well
mind, being with the universities, 1 be

should be
as

my

lieve that the conditions in the capitation grant
statutes are unconstitutional. But, as with equal

predict with
me. (I am
in Rodriguez, to settle for

financing requirements, 1

cannot

certainty that the courts will be with
1

prepared here,
a plurality of one.)
as

was

The argument for the validity of the imposed
conditions is not difficult to state. It takes the
form of an aphorism that is almost as popular on
the campus
"There is no
related

would be the Constitution of the United States.
It seems clear to me that the Constitution does
the government any authority to tell
the academy what courses should be taught or
which students it should teach. On the contrary,
if

we

take seriously the dicta from the Supreme

Court's opinions that 1 have already read to you,
such actions by the government are not only not

authorized, they

are

specifically forbidden

as

vio

lations of the First Amendment.

The argument goes, however, that the govern
ment is not imposing curricula or choosing stu

simply offering to buy from the uni
freedom. And surely, it is said, we have

dents. It is

versity its

of the University of Chicago as
such thing as a free lunch." It is the

known since the reversal of the AAA opinion, that

economics that "he

it decides that the expen

principle of classical

who pays the piper calls the tune." But 1 submit
that the proposition is-or should be

inapplicable here for two reasons.
The first is that, as a matter of fact, the uni ver
sity is "paying the piper" every bit as much, if not
more than, the government. Each is contributing
a large sum of money and assets for the education

Congress

was

undertaken

as

a

partnership

authorize the

long as
"general

purchase of anything

welfare."

years ago, before Charles Reich turned
from lawyer-philosopher into a flower child who

It

was

sought to "green" America, that he perspica
ciously noted in a law review article:
clearly defined problem posed
by government largesse is the way that it can
be used to apply pressure against the exer
cise of constitutional rights. A first principle
The

ar

for the benefit of the university
rangement,
but rather for the benefit of the society for which
the government is purportedly the representative
not

most

should be that government must not have
power to "buy up" rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. It should not be able to

and the university is not. As between the univer
sity and the government, it is the government
that is the beneficiary of the program, not the

impose

largesse that would be in
valid if imposed on something other than a
"gratuity." [Reich, "The New Property," 73
Yale L.]. 733, 779 (1964)]
any condition

university. But both university and government

financing work in it.
Second, the proposition about the payer and
the piper implies that the payer is spending his
own money and is, therefore, entitled to condi

can

that it wants, so
diture is for the

of additional medical students. The program for

expansion

to

give

not

on

are

tion the payment. That is not the

paid by the government
who spend it
bureaucrats
to the
money

that appropriates

case

here. The

belongs
legislature

no more

or

the

it than money in the control of

or corporate trustees belongs to the trust
rather than to the beneficiary of the trust. A

private
ees

trustee's funds

are

held

by

the trustee to be

The fact is that at
actions
power

could not legitimately order it to do would
be not only immoral, but illegal. Blackmail, at
common

the victim to

applicable

in this

case

of force to

perform

even an

My proposition that the conditions

there is great discretion in the trustees, the ex
penditures are. valid only if they fall within the

document, which

use

an

form.

pended not at the whim
only in accord with the will of the grantor and for
the best interests of the beneficiary. Even where

charter of the trust

is the threat of the

law,

act
act,
to
a
under
that the victim is otherwise
duty
per

compel

ex

will of the trustee but

lower level of society the

ment

ernment

or

a

of the government to use its spending
to get the academy to do what the govern

in

grant

are

invalid is

not

on

the gov

without support

Supreme Court decisions. There

is

a

judicial

doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" that is

not

to

the example I have cited. Were it
a bifur

for the fact that the doctrine has taken

cated

path

in the

Supreme Court, 1 should be

more

certain of my conclusion.

the two lines of decision have
reconciled.

time has

Perhaps the

and

Unfortunately,
been

never

fully

a

come.

Co.

Railroad Commission

v.

of Califor

nia, 271 U.S. 583 (1926). There a state, with un
disputed "power to prohibit the use of the public

highways
a

trucker

tion of

cases," attempted

in proper
to

become

a common

using the highways.

the State could not do

by

carrier

to

condi

which, though

in

job
privilege.
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right of
employment
(McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass.
216, 220 [1892]). A policeman, said Holmes,
"may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a police
man." Although the holding of this case is prob
ably no longer good law, there are recent de

carefully

compelled

as

a

to surrender his

condition of his

cisions that sustain the

In
of the elements of compulsion
between
choice
a
is
carrier
given
reality, the

propriety of imposing

....

conditions which

livelihood

or

submit to

may constitute

an

It would be

a

where the Court sustained the power of the gov
ernment to withhold presidential election funds

requirement which

intolerable burden.

unless the recipient surrendered his right to
spend other moneys in his pursuance of the pres

palpable incongruity to
strike down an act of state legislation which,
by words of express divestment, seeks to
strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the
federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by
which the same result is accomplished under
the guise of a surrender of a right in ex
change for a valuable privilege which the.
a

idency.
I think that the

itations is that it may not

one

thought in

of the lim

right

,

as

a

condition of its favor, it may, in like manner,
compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable
that guaranties embedded in the Constitu
tion of the United States may thus be manip
out

of existence. [271 U.S. 593-94]

The doctrine has been not infrequently invoked,

was

a

right has been

necessary

legitimate

ingre

statuto

conference committee without debate

or informed judgment. It offered nothing toward
the goals or purposes that the statute was enacted
to effect. It would deprive the universities of

impose conditions

constitutional

its surrender

question. That is not the case with
the medical school example, certainly so far as
the HEW power of appointing students is con
cerned. That provision was added as an after

which require the relinquishment of con
stitutional rights. If the State may compel the

surrender of

is

ry scheme in

grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to
impose. But the power of the state in that
one

case.

constitutional

a

dient in the effectuation of the

challenge the proposition
that, as a general rule, the state, having
power to deny a privilege altogether, may

unlimited; and

cases

For, where the condition

my medical school

of surrender of

sustained,

not necessary to

not

policeman line of

clearly "not a happy one." I think, too, however,
that these cases are clearly distinguishable from

state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is

respect is

destroy constitutional rights

that could not be taken directly. Thus, the recent
decision of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),

the rock and the whirlpool-an option to
forego a privilege which may be vital to his

ulated

remove

on

indirection what it

none

.

toll

free speech

of requiring a surrender,
form voluntary, in fact lacks

process

a

ficial could be

so

of academic freedom,
state may not

the development of constitutional
law. Holmes was on the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts when he ruled that a police of

heavy

safeguarded against direct assault, a.re open
to destruction by the indirect but no less ef
fective

professor

a

because he invoked his

from his

The Court said that

guaranties,

area

back to still another of Oliver Wendell Holmes's
unfortunate witticisms that have all taken so

could not do directly.
Constitutional

in the

once

There is another line of decisions that dates

require

as a

least

Fifth Amendment

The line of authority that I would follow de
rives from a mundane case entitled Frost & Frost

Trucking

at

when the Court held that

their constitutional rights without any
vailing values being attained.

counter

Obviously, I have exhausted you, if not my sub
ject, with a legal discourse that you did not come
to hear. My point is only that I do not think it
incumbent on the universities placidly to submit
to invasions

of their academic integrity

as a con

dition of receiving financing from the govern-
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ment.

And I wish that the universities would

show

commitment to their function that would

a

afford them the courage to face up to the illegal
demands that threaten the destruction of the

independence of the academy,

an

independence

which is the only justification for its existence.
I started this tirade with a quotation from

Byron. I should properly end
from

the

it with

a

quotation

legend-not Shaw's, but

Faust

Goethe's. A human who has sold his soul
devil is

no

longer

a

human. An

to

the

academy that has
faculty and

sold its will-over the selection of

students,

over

its curriculum and research-to

In

academy.
bargain. Nor
should it be thought that the bureaucracy's power

the government is no longer an
neither case can it be called a fair

is less evil than that of the devil.
not

Certainly it was
brought the

the best interest of Faust that

devils

o ffer, nor is it the best interest of the
academy that brings forth the government's
largesse. It may be, however, that the idea of the
university is of consequence only to a free soci
ety, a concept which is itself going out of style so
rapidly as to be seen only here and there in the

United States and almost nowhere else.
In sum, all that I have to say to you could

be-and should have been-stated in two
tences.

(1) Before

devil, find

out

the

sen

be financed by the
of his money. (2) The

you agree to
true cost

further away you get from local
closer you come to the devil.

financing,

the

Disclosure of

Intelligence Budgets
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Gerhard C asper*

are

While this is clearly one of the purposes served
by the Appropriations Clause, this was not its

the issue whether disclosure of intel

main function when conceived. The Convention

interest." As I

subject are sparse yet relatively
originally drafted, the clause
unambiguous.
meant to ensure the control of the "popular"

Chairman, Members of the

Mr.Your letter of
addressing
ligence budgets

Committee:

invitation stated that you

is "in the

public
lack expertise concerning this general question,
shall

not

attempt

specifically

asked

to

me

answer

to

do

so.

I

it-nor have you

All I

am

prepared

to do this morning is to give you my analysis of
some constitutional and legal issues connected

with disclosure of

intelligence budgets.

First I turn to the constitutional question,
which is whether Article I, section 9, mandates

disclosure. Most
focus

on

my view

analysis of this

section tends to

on

House of

Representatives

bills

as

early debate

over

particular addressee

is mentioned.

restriction upon the disbursement

the Executive

authority of

ters.

states in

an

was

over

important element in
as well as

representation

was

government. A special
appointed to report on these mat
the

new

The discussion,

on

July 6, 1787, of the

com

report" led to a major comment by Ben
Franklin
concerning the appropriations
jamin
policy. Indeed, as far as I can make out, this
comment by a crucial member of the special
mittee

committee is

nificance

department."2

all money bills

as

the role of the "aristocratic" Senate and the

committee

no

well

Thus the clause
the

that the Appropriations Clause

What purpose is served by the clause? Its word
ing has led to the belief that "it was intended as a

over

appropriations. It was espe
that
appropriations bills should
cially provided
House.
originate in the
tax

small

is at least

the

As

the Statement and Account Clause. It is

equally relevant and important.' The Appropria
tions Clause is formulated as a prohibition,
although

debates

on

the only

the

statement

of any sig

subject matter:

Doer. Franklin did not

mean

to go into a

jus

*Max Pam

tification of the Report; but as it had been
asked what would be the use of restraining

Law

the 2d branch

Professor of American and Foreign
and Professor of Political Science. Mr.

Casper delivered this
Senate

on

statement to

the Select

Intelligence of the United States
April 28, 1977.

Committee

on

legislature] from
meddling with money bills, he could not but
remark that it was always of importance that
the people should know who had disposed of

[of

the

their money, & how it had been disposed of.
It was a maxim that those who feel, can best

judge. This end would, he thought, be best
attained, if money affairs were to be confined
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to the

immediate representatives of the

people."
Franklin's remark suggests that the Appropria
Clause itself was intended to serve
accountability. The subsequent elimination of

tions

the requirement that appropriations bills origi
nate in the House does not change this assess

quired

be

to

published,

such

objects, as legitimately belong to
defense, and the general welfare."6
Story understood clearly that the Appropriations

Clause and the Statement and Account Clause
are but part and parcel of what I have called the

accountability function: "Congress is made the
guardian of this treasure; and to make their re
sponsibility complete and perfect, a regular ac
count of the receipts and expenditures is re-

Gerhard Casper

added

and the details of disclosure. I find the short dis
cussion of these matters

on

the floor of the Con

vention and in the ratification conventions

pretation of the

to

was

closing hours of the Convention on Sep
tember 14, 1787 (the Convention was adjourned
on September 17). The crucial question as to its
interpretation is how much discretion the clause
grants Congress as to the timing of accounting

Story, displaying his usual acumen, thus saw
the object of the Appropriations Clause correctly
as interposing a restraint
by which the public
treasure "should be applied, with unshrinking
common

may

in the

ambiguous

the

people

The Statement and Account Clause

rnent."

honesty,

that the

know what money is expended, for what purpose,
and by what authority."?

as

materially
clause beyond what

not to assist

so

in the inter
one

can de

duce from the text itself and from its function in
relation

to

the

Appropriations Clause." Only

as

the timing may we conclude from the
debates that accounting need not necessarily be
concerns

done

annually,

amended
What

out

as a

one can

clause is that

requirement

of Mason's

original

deduce from the

publication of a

dated, that such

to

this effect

was

motion.

wording of the

statement is

man

statement must account for all

receipts and expenditures, and, finally, that the
timing must be such that the statement can actu

ally perform

its

accounting function. The clause

does not by itself mandate a specificity of details
except insofar as the accounting categories must

"for the expenses attending the intercourse of the
United States with foreign nations," which in

reasonably relate

cluded the authority to borrow the amount
needed, was for ransoming American hostages
held by Algiers, "purchasing peace," and paying

clauses-to
ture

(and

the purpose of the two
accountability of the legisla
to

secure

the executive

branch).
principles suggest

What do these

major question before

as

the

to

you: whether there is

constitutional obligation

a

publish figures con
cerning intelligence expenditures? Further
analysis may be aided by looking at possible ac
to

in terms of

three different
considerations: (1) the purpose of expenditures;
(2) the magnitude of expenditures; and (3) truth
fulness.

counting categories

In terms of

accounting by governmental

pose it is obvious that

has to

some

pur

detailed breakdown

because otherwise the

off

foreign officials and other individuals. In
submitting a report of the secretary of state on the
subject to the Congress, President Washington,
on December 16,1793, requested confidentiality,
since "it would still be

improper that

some

par

ticulars of this communication should be made
known." "Both justice and policy required," the
President stated, "that the source of that informa
tion should remain secret,
sums

as a

knowledge of the

have been given for peace and
have a disadvantageous influence

meant to

ransom

might

people will
not know for what purpose their money has been
expended. But what do we mean by purpose? Is
the category "for purposes of defense" too broad?

of 1795 and submitted to the Senate in February
of 1796. The Account of Receipts and Expendi

Does the

tures

second

occur

answer

to this

consideration,

question depend

the

magnitude

on

the

of expendi

tures? If the accounting were in terms of "100
billion dollars for purposes of national security,"
I

assume we

would all agree that such statement
Congress nor the executive

would make neither

genuinely accountable. But what degree of detail
is required? The question is, essentially, "How
much is too much?" (or

"I{ow little

is too

much?").
stitutional lawyers

ambiguous,

frequently

con

turn to its inter

pretation by early congresses, the First Congress
in particular. The First Congress authorized

$40,000 annually

to

provide

"the

means

of inter

between the United States and foreign na
tions" and gave the President discretion not to
account specifically for such expenditures as he

course

thought

it inadvisable to make

public." This dis
continued and the procedures for
malized by the Second Congress.?"
The Third Congress increased the appropria
tion for expenses "in relation to the intercourse
was

between the United States and

by

foreign nations"

1 million dollars and made this very substan

tial amount

future

A

proceedings for the same objects."12
treaty with Algiers was concluded in the fall

made
On
tion

for the year ending September 30, 1796,
no reference to Algiers-related expenses.I''

January 2, 1797, the House passed a resolu
calling on the President to provide informa

tion about the

Algiers affairs;14 it was supplied in
January 9, 1797, and included a
relatively detailed report by the secretary of the
Treasury.P 'A secret debate took place on January
17. On February 21, 1797, the House voted 53 to
confidence

on

36 to lift the injunction of secrecy with respect to

When the Constitution is

cretion

on

presidential discretion to
withhold details from the public eye, although an
account of the expenditures was to be laid before
Congress.P
The rather startling increase in appropriations
subject

to

the Treasury report and some other matters.l"
What the episode suggests is that Congress was

satisfied with appropriating a very substantial,
amount of money for a rather vaguely stated pur
pose and, perhaps, that there is more of a re

lationship than some of the commentators admit
between the Appropriations Clause and the
Statement and Account Clause, on the one hand,
and the Journal Secrecy Clause in Article I, sec
5, on the other.I?
However, in order properly

tion

to

evaluate the

should be kept in mind that Congress
itself was generally informed. It must also be re
membered that it took Congress some time to
events, it

evolve the degree of appropriations specificity
considered necessary to forestall unwarranted
discretion, an endeavor helped along by the de

velopment of a party system.l"

On the other

hand,
early state
of receipts and expenditures are mostly in

it should not be overlooked that the
ments

21

of such very

general categories as "diplo
department," "military department,"
"trade with Indians," etc.l?
In view of this early history-? and in view of my
general sense of the attitude of the Framers to

terms

matic
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ward secrecy, I find it difficult to believe that the
Statement and Account Clause mandates annual
disclosures of intelligence expenditures if it is
the considered judgment of Congress that publi
cation would harm the national

hasten

to stress

security. Let

that difficult matters

are

me

difficult,

and before I read the headline "constitutional
law expert states secrecy of intelligence
is warranted," I should like to be heard
The

following points

seem

I doubt whether there is

a

crucial to

budgets

me.

First,

constitutional

com

to

a

matter

of judgment,

a

judgment

that has

take into consideration the need of the voters

appropriations and accounting is

stitutionally bearable.
counting

to

serve

functions; it cannot be served, however, by pre
tending to spend money for one purpose while in
reality it is spent for a totally different purpose.
The present system for hiding intelligence ap
propriations should be scrutinized very closely as
what it does in terms of poor accounting and
bad constitutional practices. Obviously, this is all
to

can

say

the

on

subject,

no

not

policy underlying Article I, section 9, is obvi
ously pertinent. Second, this is not to say that
what is apparently the present system of decep-

not

privy

to

mean

that the accountability function of Arti

cle I, section 9, does not require disclosure of
information about intelligence expenditures at

years after the

the

am

requirement of annual disclosure. This does

historical interest

syllogism, although

since I

the precise categories used for making intelli
gence appropriations. Third, I said that there was

behind

constitutional

any purpose must be accurate.

This requirement may be served by allocating
funds to relatively nonspecific governmental

for adequate information. In making that judg
ment, I do not believe that Congress can hide
a

con

Here the third consider

ation mentioned earlier becomes relevant. Ac

I

out.

mand. This, of course, does not mean that Con
gress has no authority to legislate disclosure.
This is

tive

point before the subject becomes

some

one

of

only. Whether this means two
fact, three years after the fact, or

five years after the fact cannot be determined
with any precision and is a matter of judgment for
those who have the relevant information.
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R. H. Coase*

general observations.
largely based on my
knowledge of developments within the United
wish to

start

with two

I First, what I have

to say is

States and Britain. But I have sufficient

con

fidence in the international character of science
to

believe that what

can

be observed in these

because it says

so

little except what is

generally

accepted.
What is the subject with which I am dealing?
What I am concerned with is what determines
the boundaries between

disciplines,

particular

in

with what determines the boundaries between

sciences, sociol
ogy, political science, psychology, and the like
(without excluding the possibility that there may

countries is

economics and the other social

any rate in my case,

ticular time can, of course, be discovered by
amining the range of activities engaged in

paralleled by similar developments
elsewhere. My second observation is that a paper
which deals with what is happening within a
series of disciplines and which ranges so wide
within economics itself, must inevitably mean, at
that it deals with many sub

jects about which the writer's knowledge is

tremely

ex

vague. What I have to say will often have

the character of assertion rather than that of
-conclusion based

on a

'a

careful study of the litera
covered by my subject. I

ture in the many fields

believe that such

a

careful study would confirm

what I assert. But it is equally true that it may
refute my views. Papers presented at inter

national

conferences

are

not

usually high-risk

ventures, but this one is. However, I do not think
that what is called for at this stage is a paper

guarded by qualifications and

difficult to attack

Professor of Economics. This
paper was originally given at the International
Economic Association at Kiel, Germany, in July
*Clifton

1975.

R. Musser

be

overlaps). What the boundaries

are

at any par
ex

by

members of any given professional association,
by the subjects treated in the journals devoted to

particular disciplines, by the

courses

given

in

university departments, by the topics covered in
textbooks, and by the books collected in libraries
of knowledge.
discipline is thus
a forecast of what topics will be covered by pro
fessional associations, journals, libraries, and the
like. I have long considered the definition of
economics which Boulding attributed to Viner,
and has since often been repeated, "Economics
is what economists do,"! as essentially sound, but
only if it were accompanied, which it never is, by
a
description of the activities in which
economists actually engage.
If the question is asked, how do these bound
aries between disciplines come to be what they
are, the broad answer I give is that they are deconcerned with the various

areas

A forecast of the boundaries of a

termined by competition. The process is
essentially the same as that which determines the
activities undertaken
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by firms

or, to

take another

the extent of empires. Gibbon de
scribes how Augustus came to accept the bound

necessarily clear-cut, and different answers and
different ways of tackling the same question may
exist side by side, each satisfying its own market.

example,

So

aries of the Roman

the field another group but may merely, to use an
economist's terminology, increase their market

was

easy

Empire. Gibbon says that it
for Augustus to discover that "Rome, in

her present exalted situation, had much less to
hope than to fear from the chance of arms; and
that, in the prosecution of remote wars, the

undertaking became every day more difficult, the
event more doubtful, and the possession more
precarious, and less beneficial."2 The same kind
of calculation ultimately led, and this is Gibbon's

grand theme,

to

an

abandonment of much of what

had been contained within the Roman

and

finally

to its

Empire

division within quite another set
same with disci

one

group of practitioners may not drive from

share. Of course, when the number of those who
are

satisfied with the

the field may be abandoned
those whose competence is

they

compete
profitable market.

more

If

we

look

and

according

to whether

they find

profitable to do so, and this is in part de
by the success or failure of the prac
titioners in other disciplines in answering the
same questions.
Since different people are

any group

at

a

altogether except by

so

low elsewhere that

wider,

more

active, and

the work that economists

are

at

or, at any

answer

given by

the present time, there can be little
doubt that economics is expanding its boundaries

doing

plines. The practitioners in a given discipline ex
tend or narrow the range of the questions they
to

in

cannot

of boundaries. It is much the

attempt

answers

of practitioners becomes so small and/or the
questions for which this is true are few or trivial,

more

rate, that economists are moving more
into other disciplines. They have been

conspicuously active
they have developed

in

political science,

where

theory of poli
deal
of
great
empirical work
an

economic

it

tics and have done

termined

analyzing voting behaviour. 3 Economists have
also moved into sociology, and we now have an

satisfied with different answers, victory is not

a

theory of marriage.s Nor should we be
surprised that there is also an economic theory of

economic
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suicide." Other subjects on which economists'
have worked are Iinguistics," education," and na
tional defence." I

am sure

that it is

only my lack of

familiarity with what is going on in the other so
cial sciences which restricts my list. One striking
example,

with which I

economics in the

am

familiar,

study of

is the

use

of

law. 9 The

movement is clear. Economists

are

general
extending the

range of their studies to include all the social sci
ences, which I take to be what we mean when we

speak of economics' contiguous disciplines.
What is the reason why this is happening? One
completely satisfying explanation (in more than
one sense) would be that economists have by
now solved all the major problems posed by the
economic system, and therefore, rather than be
come

unemployed

or

be forced to deal with the

trivial

problems which remain to be solved, have
employ their obviously considerable
talents in achieving a similar success in the other
social sciences. However, it is not possible to
decided to

examine any

area

of economics with which I have

familiarity without finding major puzzles for
which we have no agreed solutions or, indeed,
questions
reason

to

which

we

have

no answer

at

all. The

for this movement of economists into

neighbouring fields is certainly not that we have
solved the problems of the economic system-it
would perhaps be more plausible to argue that
economists are looking for fields in which they
can

have

some success.

Another

explanation for this interest in
neighbouring fields might be that modern
economists have had a more broadly based edu-

preceded them and that in
are wider, with the
naturally dissatisfied with
narrow a range of problems

by what it is that the group of scholars is
studying, although scholars in a particular disci
pline may use different techniques or approaches

presented by the economic system. Such
explanation seems to me largely without
merit. If we think of Adam Smith or John Stuart
Mill or Alfred Marshall, the range of questions
with which they deal is greater than is oommonly

ability of a particular group in
handling certain techniques of analysis, or an ap
proach, may give them such advantages that they
are able to move successfully into another field or
even to dominate it. In making these distinctions,
I do not wish to deny that techniques, ap
proaches, and subject matter will all exert some

cation than those who

their interests

consequence
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result that they are
being restricted to so
that

as

an

modem work

found in

a

pression

is reinforced if

on

articles which appear in

economics. This im

have

we

most

regard

the

to

of the economics

an increasingly great extent,
highly formal technical ques
tions of economic analysis, usually treated math
ematically. The general impression one derives,
particularly from the journals, is of a subject nar
rowing rather than extending the range of its

journals, which,

to

tend to deal with

This

interest.

seems

inconsistent with the

con

of economists into the other

current movement

social sciences, but I believe there is a connec
tion between these two apparently contradictory

attempt to forecast what the scope
of economists' work is likely to be in future
are

which is

to

what is needed if

surely

to the

helpful

libraria�s

benefit this conference

understand the
been moving
we

together
separate

a

It

be

to

and others for whose

planned-we have to
why economists have

likely

to be in the

future. To

have to consider what it is that binds
group of scholars

is

an

seems

to

so

me

that

and enables

economist,

sociologist, another
on.

are

was

reason

profession

someone

we

into the other social sciences and

what the situation is

do this,

a

us

they form
to say

someone

need

a

a
so

group

conceal from you at this stage my
belief that in the long run it is the subject matter,
not

the kind of question which the practitioners
trying to answer, which tends to be the dominant
are

factor

answering the

producing

same

questions. However,

in

the short run, the

influence at any given time. Nor would I argue
that it is inevitable that techniques and approach

only in the short run.
long run as well.
But I believe there are reasons for thinking that
this will not usually be the case. If my descrip
tion of the binding forces of a scholarly discipline
is correct and if my assessment of their long-and
short-run influences is also valid, then we will
have to decide whether the current movement by
should

exert

their influence

They could be dominant

in the

economists into the other social sciences is the

such

an

a

technique

or

approach,

or

whether

extension of their work illuminates and is

interrelated with the solution of the central ques
attempt to answer, that is,

tions which economists

by the nature of the subject matter
they study. To the extent this movement is
based on technique or approach, we can expect a
gradual displacement of economists from their
newly won ground. To the extent that it is neces
sitated by their subject matter, we may expect the
range of studies undertaken by economists to be
permanently enlarged.
My first example of a technique, linear pro
gramming, is one which I am particularly un
qualified to discuss, but, fortunately, extensive
is necessitated

which

r

else

political scientist, and

that what binds such

a

that

together is one or more of the following: common
techniques of analysis, a common theory or ap
proach to the subject, or a common subject mat
ter. I

in

triumph of

developments.
If we

termined

the cohesive force which makes

group of scholars a recognizable profession
with its own university departments, journals,
a

and libraries. I say this in part because the tech

niques of analysis and the theory or approach
used are themselves to a considerable extent de-

discussion is not called for.10 It is, if I understand
correctly, a mathematical method for discovering
the proportions in which inputs should be com
a certain result at

bined in order to achieve
minimum cost. Such

technique has, potentially,
is, however, dif
ficult to believe that such a highly mathematical
technique could not be as easily acquired or as
well handled by suitably endowed scholars in
other disciplines. Indeed, some of these might
find such a technique easier to acquire or handle
applications

a

in many fields. It

than would most economists. To the extent that
economists have moved into other fields

using

linear programming, I would expect the forces of
competition to be such that they would be largely

role, except to the extent that the particular de
cisions being investigated are closely related to

displaced, although individual

their main

might

economists

still do useful work using linear programming. In
any case, it seems improbable that knowledge of
a technique such as linear
programming would

become such

essential part of any discipline as
to outweigh command of the theory or knowl
edge of the subject matter. One would not expect
an

economists to dominate such fields

oil refinery engineering

if

as

nutrition

or

More

concerns.

important and

persuasive is the
view, which I associate with the name of Gary

Becker, that economic theory or the economic
approach can form the means by which
can work in, if not take over, the other
social sciences.P But before examining this point
of view, I will consider what I believe to be the

economists

seems

normal

binding force

improbable) economists as a class were particu
larly adept in linear programming.
The employment of quantitative methods, now
so commonly part of the equipment of the mod

subject

matter.

ern

even

(which

economist, has also enabled

economists to

plines.

move

To the extent

easier to

a

number of

neighbouring disci
that economists find it

into

acquire these techniques and/or

can

handle them with greater dexterity than their col
leagues in the other social sciences (in part be

they

cause

use

them

so

frequently),

it is

possible

that this may offset their unfamiliarity with the
subject matter of these other disciplines and the

analytical framework within which these other
social scientists work. But it

fragile basis for
by

predicting

a

seems

long-run

a

rather

movement

economists into the other social sciences.

My

next

example, cost-benefit analysis,

is

more

difficult to discuss.l! My guess would be that the
great bulk of the incursions made by economists
into

contiguous and not-so-contiguous disci

plines

in recent years have been in connection

with the

undertaking of cost-benefit studies;
Cost-benefit analysis seems to me best described
as a technique. But since it is
essentially applied
price theory, having as its aim to give a monetary
value to what is gained and what is lost by follow
ing a particular course of action, it is certainly an
activity in which economists have some obvious
advantages. However, since these studies are
usually carried out with a view to facilitating de
cision making, particularly by public bodies,
with the problem to be investigated selected by
such bodies, rather than with a view to under
standing the system of which these public bodies
are a part, and since economists
working in un
familiar fields will tend to rely on the work of
others for their data, economists engaged in these
studies will tend to playa useful but subordinate

more

of a

scholarly profession,

its

What do economists study? What do they do?
They study the economic system. Marshall de
fined economics in the first edition of the Princi

ples of Economics thus: "Political Economy, or
Economics, is a study of man's actions in the or
dinary business of life; it inquires how he gets his
and how he

income

use s

it." 13 A modern

economist, Stigler, has phrased it differently:
"Economics is the study of the operation of eco
nomic organizations, and economic organizations
are social (and rarely individual)
arrangements to
deal with the production and distribution of eco
nomic goods and services."14 Both of these def
initions of economics emphasize that economists

study certain kinds of activity. And this accords
well with the actual topics dealt with in a book on
economics. What economists study is the work
ing of the social institutions which bind together
the economic system: firms, markets for goods
and services, labor markets, capital markets, the

banking system, international trade, and
is the

which

so on.

It

interest in these social institutions

common

distinguishes the

economics

profession.

A very different kind of definition is that of

Robbins: "Economics is the science which

studies human behaviour
tween ends

and

scarce

alternative uses."15 Such

a

as

a

relationship

means

be

which have

definition makes

eco

study of human choice. It is clearly too
wide if regarded as a description of what
economists do. Economists do not study all
human choices, or, at any rate, they have not
nomics

done

yet. However, the view that econom
study of all human choice, although it

so as

ics is

does

a

a

not

tell

the nature of the economic

theory
approach which is to be employed in all the
social sciences, certainly calls for the develop
ment of such a theory.
or

us
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I said earlier that there are at present two ten
dencies in operation in economics which seem to
be inconsistent but which, in fact, are not. The

utility

first consists of

legal or political system, it is to be expected that
their behaviour will be, in a broad sense, similar.

enlargement of the
economists' interests so far as subject
an

concerned. The second is

fessional interest

to

a

more

of

scope

matter is

narrowing of

pro

formal, technical,

commonly mathematical, analysis. This more
formal analysis tends to have a great generality. It
may say less, or leave a lot unsaid, about the eco
but, because of its generality, the
becomes
analysis
applicable to all social systems.
It is this generality of their analytical systems

nomic system,

which,

believe, has facilitated the

I

of

maximizer.

Since the

system

are

people

the

who operate in the economic
people who are found in the

same

by no means follows that an approach de
veloped to explain behaviour in the economic
system will be equally successful in the other
social sciences. In these different fields, the pur
But it

poses that
same, the

men

seek to achieve will not be the

degree of consistency in behaviour need

not be the same, and, in particular, the in
stitutional frameworks within which the choices

made

are

economists into the other social sciences, where

able that

an

they will presumably repeat the successes (and
the failures) which they have had within econom

these purposes and the character of the in
stitutional framework (how, for example, the

ics itself.

political and legal systems actually operate) will
require specialized knowledge not likely to be
acquired by those who work in some other disci
pline. Furthermore, a theory appropriate for the
analysis of these other social systems will pre
sumably need to embody features which deal
with the important specific interrelationships of

The nature of this

described by Posner

movement

general approach has been
in his Economic Analysis of

the Law: "Economics is the science of human

choice in

a

relation

world in which

resources are

limited

human wants. It explores and tests
the implications of the assumption that man is a
in

to

rational maximizer of his ends in life, his
satisfactions-what we shall call his 'self

are

quite different.

ability

to

It

seems

to

me

prob

discern and understand

that system.

of human choice will not be enough to cause
sociologists, political scientists, and lawyers to

strengthened in this view by a consider
played by utility theory in eco
nomic analysis. Up to the present it has been
largely sterile. To say that people maximize util
ity tells us nothing about the purposes for which
they engage in economic activity and leaves us
without any insight into why people do what they
do. As Stigler has told us, the chief implication of
utility theory is that, "if consumers do not buy
less of a commodity when their incomes rise,
they will surely buy less when the price of the
commodity rises."17 But that consumers demand

abandon their field

more

interest.'

"16

By defining economics as the "sci
ence of human choice," economics becomes the
study of all purposeful human behaviour, and its
scope is

therefore conterminous with all the

cial sciences. It is

so

thing to make such a claim;
it is quite another to translate it into reality. At a
time when the King of England claimed to be
also King of France, he was not always welcome
one

in Paris. The claim that economics is the science

or,

painfully,

to

become

I

am

ation of the part

at

a

lower price is known to everyone,
economist or not, who is at all famil

economists. The dominance of the other social

whether

sciences

by economists, if it happens, will not
about simply by redefining economics but
because of something which economists possess

iar with the

come

seems

and which enables them to handle

political, legal,

and similar

sociological,
problems better than

the present practitioners in these other social sci
ences. I take it to be the view of Becker and
Posner that the decisive
economists possess in
is their

theory of,

or

advantage which
handling social problems
approach to, human be

haviour, the treatment of

man

as

a

rational,

an

operation of a market. Utility theory
likely to handicap than to aid
in their work in contiguous disci

more

economists

plines. Recently the work of Lancaster on
"characteristics analysis"18 and of Becker on
"commodities,"19 which relate the satisfactions
derived from goods and services to certain spec
ified more fundamental needs, shows promise of
being more fruitful. But it seems improbable that
the list of the important "commodities", to use
Becker's term, will be the

same

in the various

social sciences

that

they will be uncovered ex
cept by specialists
disciplines.
Economics, it must be admitted, does appear to
or

in those

be

more

than the other social sci

developed

But the great

which economics

advantage
possessed is that economists are able to use
the "measuring rod of money." This has given a
precision to the analysis, and, since what is mea
sured by money are important determinants of
ences.

has

human behaviour in the economic system, the
analysis has considerable explanatory power.

Furthermore, the data (on prices and incomes) is
generally available, so hypotheses can be
examined and checked. Marshall said: "[T]he
steadiest motive to ordinary business work is the
desire for the pay which is the material reward of
work. The pay may be on its way to be spent
selfishly or unselfishly, for noble or base ends.
...

But the motive is

amount

supplied by

a

definite

of money: and it is this definite and exact

money measurement of the

steadiest motives in

business life, which has enabled economics to
outrun every other branch of the study of man."20
If it is true that the more developed state of eco
nomics

as

compared

has been due

to

the other social sciences

the

happy chance (for econom
ics) that the important factors determining eco
to

nomic behaviour

be measured in money, it
suggests that the problems faced by practitioners
in these other fields are not likely to be dis
can

sipated simply by

infusion of economists,
in
into
these
since,
moving
fields, they will com
monly have to leave their strength behind them.
an

The

analysis developed in economics is not
likely to be successfully applied in other subjects

without major modifications.
If I am right about the relative unimportance of
technique as a basis for the choice of professional

groupings, if subject

the domi

really
factor, with the theory or approach in large
part determined by the subject matter, what is
matter is

nant

the outlook for the work of economists in the
other social sciences? I would not expect them to
indefinitely their triumphal advance,

sign that they possess certain advan
handling the problems of those disci
plines. One is, I believe, that they study the eco
nomic system as a unified interdependent system
and therefore are more likely to uncover the basic
interrelationships within a social system than
someone who is less accustomed to
looking at the
working of a system as a whole. Another is that a
study of economics makes it difficult to ignore
factors which are clearly important and which
ences

is

a

tages in

in all social systems. Such a factor
would be that people choose their occupations to
a large extent on the basis of money incomes.
Another would be that a higher price lowers the

playa part

demand. Such factors may appear in various
guises, but an economist is likely to see through

them. Punishment, for example, can be regarded
as the price of crime. An economist will not de
bate whether increased punishment will reduce

crime; he will merely try to answer the question,
by how much? The economist's analysis may fail
to

touch

some

ofthe

problems

found in the other

social systems, but often the analysis can be
brought to bear. And the economist will take full
advantage of those opportunities which occur
when the "measuring rod of money" can be used.
But if the main advantage which an economist
brings to the other social sciences is simply a way
of looking at the world, it is hard to believe, once
the value of such economic wisdom is

ognized,

that it will not be

acquired by

rec

some

in these

other fields. This is already
happening in law and political science. Once
some of these practitioners have
acquired the
but
valuable
truths
which
economics has
simple

practitioners

to

offer, and this

is the natural

competitive

re

sponse, economists who try to work in the other

social sciences will have lost their main advan
tage and will face competitors who know more
about the subject matter than they do. In such a
situation, only the exceptionally endowed
economist is likely to be able to make a sig
nificant contribution to our knowledge of the

continue

other social sciences.

and it may be that they will be forced to withdraw
from some of the fields which they are now so

Economists may, however, study other social
systems, such as the legal and political systems,
not with the aim of contributing to law or political

busily cultivating.

But such

a

the practitioners in the other

forecast

depends on
disciplines making
The

success
competitive response.
economists in moving into the other social

a

of
sci-

science but because it is necessary if they

understand the
itself. It has

come

are

to

of the economic system
to be realized by many

working

29

economists in recent times that parts of these

30

other social systems

are so

economic system

to

they

as

of

be

intermeshed with the
as

much

a

other social systems, above all the legal system, is
now widely accepted by economists. It has re

part of that

sulted in

sociological, political, or
Thus
it
is
legal system.
hardly possible to discuss
the functioning of a market without considering
the nature of the property right system, which
determines what can be bought and sold and
which, by influencing the cost of carrying out var
system

as

are

ious kinds of market

transactions, determines

by

economists. Unlike the

as

its aim the

improvement of these

a movement which, for rea
already given, seems to me likely to
be temporary, the study by economists of the ef

sons

I have

fects of the other social systems on the economic
system will I believe become a permanent part of
the work of economists. It cannot be done effec

tively by social

scientists unfamiliar with the

economic system. Such work may be carried out
in collaboration with other social scientists, but it

antitrust

is

and

For this reason, I think

as

move

economists into the other social sciences

other social sciences,

bought and sold, and by whom.s!
Similarly, the family or household and the educa
tional system are of concern to the sociologist,
but their operations affect the supply of labor to

policy, while part of the legal system
such studied by lawyers, also provide the

by

which has

what is in fact

different occupations and the patterns of con
sumption and production and are therefore also
of concern to the economist. In the same way, the
administration of the regulatory agencies and

the economic

be best done
ment

the

performance of the eco
work, because of its focus
system, is likely, in general, to

on

systern.P Such

nomic
on

studies of the effect of the

numerous

legal position

a

unlikely

to be well

done without economists.
we

may

expect the scope

framework within which firms and individuals
decide on their actions in the economic sphere.

clude studies in other social sciences. But the

The need to take into account, in analyzing the
working of the economic system, the influence of

the working of the economic system.

of economics to be

permanently enlarged

purpose will be to enable

us

to

to in

understand better
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George Gleason Bogert (1884-1977)
31
Ernst W. Puttkammer*

Bogert began his legal career as a
lawyer in Upstate New York in

George
practicing
1908. This

career

was

interrupted by

the first

World War, in which he served in the Judge Ad
vocate General's office and was cited in di

visional orders. At the end of the war, he became
an instructor at Cornell Law
School, and in 1921
he was named dean of that law school. In 1925 he
left Cornell and joined the University of Chicago
Law School faculty, where he became the James
Parker Hall Professor.

George Bogert commenced his legal writing
with

work

to

Phi Beta Kappa and to Phi Delta Phi. He

sity of Chicago Law School faculty, he joined the
faculty of Hastings College of Law in San Fran
cisco; he remained at Hastings until 1959. There
after he lived part of each year in California and
part on the farm that he and his wife Lolita had in

Michigan. He died in Florida on March 28, 1977.
The friendship my wife Helen and I had with
the Bogerts was of long standing; we shall miss
him.

the law of sales of personal prop
erty, but he soon specialized in the area of trusts,
a field in which his
writing became preeminent.
a

on

His work in this field culminated in the

publica

tion in 1935 of his IS-volume work Trusts

Trustees, which, with its later editions, has
mained the standard treatise.
At the

height of his distinguished

and,
re

career

George Bogert devoted increasing attention to
the efforts to harmonize the laws of the different

jurisdictions
as

of the United States. He

the Commissioner

on

was

active

Uniform State Laws

from New York in 1920-25 and from Illinois in
1927-49. He

was

Uniform Acts
trusts, and

on

a

principal draftsman of

the

sales, trustees' accounting,

common

trust fund.

George Bogert served as the President of the
Association of American Law Schools in 1935-36.
A 1906

graduate of Cornell College and a 1908
graduate of Cornell Law School, he was elected
*Professor

Emeritus

of Law.

was a

member of the N ew York and Illinois bars.
Upon his retirement in 1949 from the Univer

George Gleason Bogert
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Max Rheinstein
Mary

I

first

met Max

Ann Glendon* and Malcolm P.

Rheinstein when he

came

to

Chicago
1935, after teaching at Columbia
and Harvard. Even if one's German were perfect,
it

(1899-1977)

in

would be difficult

to perceive fully the extraor
of
studies
and writings of his
dinary range
German period. Fortunately, Konrad Duden de
scribes Max's contributions during this period.
Duden wrote, "He was and is unbelievably

seeing

Sharp**

perspective the vicissitudes of de

in

nazification. He

early

time the

to

seems

have foreseen at

an

cooperation of the present Ameri

and German governments.
My association with Max was closest in the

can

courses

tracts. I

we.taught

in the

comparative law of con

impatient with the slow growth of
American law-in particular with respect to form
was

generous toward the Germans who

expelled him.
Before and after the end of the war he fought with
all his might against equating Germans with

and consideration and with respect to mistake
and related matters.

Nazis and for

He

a

reasonable

read what he said and wrote

peace. One cannot
at

that time without

being moved." t Max's efforts contributed
ening asperities due

to

to

soft

the War of 1939 and to

Max did not

pointed

out

"behind"

ours

he

me

joined

indulge

this impatience of mine.

that German law
in the treatment

Ann Glendon '61 is

Boston

College.

**Malcolm Sharp is

Profesor of

Law at

Professor of Political Sci
ence Emeritus at Rosary
College and Professor
of Law Emeritus at the University of Chicago.

by

my tests

of mistake. And

in amusement at the

course

of the

so-called reasoning which had led the German
law to one happy result: A gratuitous promise of

option was said to be
"like" an effective gift.

an

*Mary

was

Max also
in

which

taught

we

wisdom-and

the

seem

to

at times

a

gratuitous grant and

comparative law of torts
be

even

he

taught

more

in

need of

courses

eral comparative law. Of course, it

was

in gen
in the
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Max Rheinstein

field of comparative family law that he made his
greatest contribution in his later years.
Max's voracious appetite for new experiences

34

and travel

was

remarkable. It

is

this, probably

than

anything else, which I shall remember
most vividly about him. It contributed to
making
his and his wife Lilly's lives happy and full.
more

*

Malcolm

*

*

has asked

Sharp

me

to

supplement

these recollections of his with some words
about the influence of Max Weber on Max

Rheinstein, and about Max Rheinstein's work in
his later years. In fact, to discuss either of these
subjects involves speaking of the other. The
years since Max's nominal retirement

from the

Law School in 1968 were as active as those that
preceded it. He published two more books;' a
steady stream of articles, and taught and lectured
frequently here as well as in Italy, The Nether
lands, and the Federal Republic of Germany.
N early all of this was a continuation of his
lifelong preoccupation with matters in which

Max Weber had awakened his interest in 1919-20
and which are now commonly grouped under the
heading of legal sociology. This is particularly
true

of the 1972 book Marriage

Stability,

Divorce

and the Law; of the 1969 lecture on Rechts
honoratioren P and his 1974 essay The Fam
ily and the Law, which introduces the Family
Law volume of the International

Comparative

Encyclopedia of

Law."

Max Rheinstein

was

of the students in

one

given by Max Weber

a

the University of
Munich during the last year of Weber's life. In
this course, General Economic Theory, Weber
presented the distillation of his life's research
course

at

and

thought. Rheinstein was then a 21-year-old
student, a World War I veteran who had
served at the Italian front ("It collapsed when I
arrived"), and a part-time librarian in Ernst
law

Rabel's comparative law institute. Weber made
such a deep impression on him that, years later,

Rheinstein described

t

K.

as

a

"labor of love" the

Duden, "Max Rheinstein: Leben und Werk," I Ius
Privatum Gentium: Festschrift fur Max Rheinstein 1 (E.
von Caemmerer, S.
Mentschikoff, and K. Zweigert, eds.,
1969).

prodigious work he did in translating, editing and
explaining Weber's Law in Economy and Soci
etu."
It is said that Weber himse If

apparently
sociology of law, together with
his presentation of the basic forms of domination,
and his political writings, was the most original
thought

that the

part of his great unfinished systematic treatise,
Economy and Societu> What Rheinstein did for
his old teacher, however, went far beyond mak
ing this important work available in English. The
complexity and subtlety of Weber's thought, as is
well known, have caused his work to be fre

quently misunderstood, oversimplified or ig
nored. The difficulties of substance have been

compounded by the impenetrability (even for
Germans) of Weber's writing style.
Max Rheinstein and Edward Shils,
working to
gether on the translation, rendered the sociology
of law more understandable by including transla
tions of other related parts of Economy and Soci
ety. They devised English equivalents for Ger
man words that were
artificially coined by
Weber. Rheinstein's remarkable footnotes and
annotations explained those frequent passages
where Weber's remarks (in the manner of Mal
colm

Sharp)

were as

cryptic

with meaning. These notes,
themselves, take the reader

they were heavy
delight to read in
through Hohfeldian
as

a

analysis, courtly love, the lost civilization of the
Khazars, the disrepute of Roman Law Studies
under National Socialism as a "product of the
Jewish mind," the Albigensian and Waldensian
heresies, and so on. Rheinstein checked Weber's
and furnished missing references for
Hindu, Chinese, Jewish, Islamic, and primitive
legal systems, as well as for Roman, English, and
medieval European law, and the laws of Ger
many, America, and France. He explained tech
sources,

nical terms from each of these systems, and in
dicated where later research or new discoveries
had altered the views of the generation of schol

whose works had been used by Weber.
Hheinsteins annotated translation itself ren
dered a monumental service to sociology in gen
eral, and legal sociology in particular. But he did
ars

more.

In

one

troduction

of his finest essays,

a

48-page

In

Weber's thought, Rheinstein in his
own lucid, systematic, and concise
style, so dif
ferent from Weber's, set forth an authoritative
to

explanation

of Weber's

sociology,

This remark

able essay makes Weber's thought seem (like
Immanuel Kant's) beautifully clear but hidden in
is narrowed

sentences where every

proposition
qualifying proposition, which in

turn is

by a
peatedly qualified, and where (still in the same
sentence) the main proposition is combined with
its set of qualifiers and subqualifiers. Weber
wrote in this fashion partly because of his in
tolerance for overgeneralization and partly be
cause, as his widow put it, "He was entirely un
concerned with the form in which he presented
his wealth of ideas. So many things came to him
out of that storehouse of his mind, once the mass
was in motion, that many times they could not be
readily forced into a lucid sentence structure."6
As his students know, Rheinstein was like
Weber in his obsession with keeping gener
re

alizations tailored close to the facts. But Rhein
stein went into Weber's storehouse of ideas and

put the wares in order. Only someone with
Rheinstein's peculiar gifts, his universality of
know ledge, his ability to see through to the

essentials, and his
guages could have

awesome

command of lan

attempted such

a

task.

The value of Rheinstein's work in

Weber

as

without

understandable

losing

any

as

he

can

making

be made

of the refinement of his

is known among

sociologists. However,
thought
Rheinstein succeeded so well in making the
rough places plain that his Introduction to Weber
often has been mistaken for "common knowl

edge" by lawyers.
So, one aspect of the Rheinstein-Weber con-.
nection is that, through Rheinstein, Weber has
continued to teach legal sociology. Another is
that Rheinstein continued to learn from Weber

and

make his

contributions to

legal
sociology. The influence of Weber on the young
Max Rheinstein entered into happy combination
to

own

with the influence of

genius, Ernst

a

quite different

sort of

Rabel, whose Assistent he became

sion of the interest Weber

plex reciprocal

inspired

with Rabel's insistence

on

ascertaining social

cease

until death

came

to Max

Rheinstein

Rheinstein
fruitful

source

of

directs attention toward the extent to which law
is a function of a particular society and facilitates
recognition of the social problems to which law is

"family law" work of the
the work of Rhein stein the legal

addressed. All of his

past 10 years was
sociologist and comparatist,

as

well

people really do?"

"What do

His

to the

methods which

came

Germany

be called Jurisprudence of Interests, and in the
United States sociological jurisprudence. The fu-

the work of

knowledge of,

and meticulous labors in, many different areas of
substantive law (in particular, obligations, suc

cession, private international law) gave depth
and credibility to his sociological and compara

Conversely, his comparative, histori
cal, and sociological perspective enriched all of
his studies of positive law. The very qualities
Rheinstein attributed to Weber are the qualities

tive work.

one came

to associate with

Rheinstein: "univer

sality of knowledge together with the gift of pen
passion for
objectivity,
accurate formulation, and
for
genius
recogniz
ing the essentials, and the relations between
"7
seemingly remote phenomena
Reinforced no doubt by his experiences in
Germany and Italy in the early 1930s, Max
always refused to be drawn into trends or fash
ions of the moment. In fact, he was ever ready to
point out that the apparently new was often
merely the reappearance of an old or recurring
phenomenon in altered guise.
It is his resistance to intellectual fads (which
he saw and identified for what they were) and his
refusal to be drawn into the methodological con
etrating analysis,

...

...

...

....

of his work

to

as

Rheinstein the private law scholar intensely con
cerned with "How does it work in practice?" and

their solution.

exposed

July

that comparative law was a
insight for sociology because it

written work

in

on

saw

Unlike many European legal scholars of his
generation, Rabel was intensely concerned with
the relevance of law to practical problems and

Through Rabel,

re

9, 1977.

troversies of the moment that

was

com

society,

ality and the practical effects of laws, released a
sustained flow of creative ideas which did not

in 1922.

Rheinstein

in the

interaction of law and

tion, it is

very

recent events

give Rheinstein's

lasting freshness. In this connec
gratifying to be able to report three
which will result in making some

a

accessible. Of the greatest im
portance is that two of Max's former students,
Reimer von Borries and Hans Leser, have edited
more

collections of papers from the

nearly 350

items in
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the Rheinstein

brought
into
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a

bibliography.

Von Borries has

many of the

comparative law writings
unified "Introduction to Comparative

Law."8 Leser has assembled an 800-page volume
of The Rheinstein Papers, in four great divisions:
Legal Theory and Sociology, Comparative Law,

Conflicts of Law, and Family Law." Finally, the
Louisiana Center for Civil Law Studies is prepar
translation of Rheinstein's early book on
Anglo-American contract law, still a standard
work in Cermany.t? Thanks to Leser and von

ing

a

Borries, writings scattered
tions and

languages

now

in various

will have

a

publica

wider audi

than would have been possible otherwise.
All who knew Max here at the Law School will
recognize that no mere recital of his accomplish
ence

ments

were,

dinary

and

gifts, larger-than-life though they

captures

or

does justice to this extraor

man."! That

encyclopedic knowledge,

made wisdom by his humanity and sense of his
tory, was, through his boundless generosity,
always at the disposal of colleagues and students.

His

legendary working capacity

was

equaled by

his capacity to enjoy the good things in life. He
loved mountains, hearty food, German beer,

chamber music, opera, and, above all, people.
His energy and courage prevailed over the se
vere bodily afflictions that beset
him, two or
three at a time, for the past twenty years. He
filled the categories of Christian and Jew, Ameri
can

and German, but

His universal

they did

not contain him.

spirit transcended these classifica

Surely, for those who knew him, it is his
charity above all that will be remembered, stored
up, treasured, and, perhaps, even imitated. It
tions.

may be that Max's

life has

permitted

glimpse
fugitive reality
apostle Paul that prophecy, tongues and knowl
edge will pass away, but Love never ends. He
was always there, behind the
open door in the
sixth-floor office, a figure of order, certainty, and
into the

permanence. In

some

he

wise and

touched, this

us a

behind the words of the

way, for those whose lives

gentle

man

will always

be there.

NOTES
1. M.

2.

3.

4.

Rheinstein, Marriage Stability, Divorce and the Law
(1972); M. Rheinstein and M. Glendon, The Law of De
cedents' Estates (1971).
Rheinstein, "Die Rechtshonoratioren und ihr Einfluss
auf Charakter und Funktion der
Rechtsordnungen," 34
RabelsZ 1 (1970). "Rechtshonoratioren" was a term
coined by Weber to designate that group of "law nota

10.

bles" who, in a given social setting, enjoy such
prestige
and influence that they decisively determine the charac
teristic features of the legal order of their
society. An

11.

English version of this lecture appeared as "Leader
Groups in American Law," 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 687 (1971).
Rheinstein, "The Family and the Law," in IV Inter
national Encyclopedia of Comparative Law Ch. 1 (A.
Chloros, ed., 1974).
Max Weber on Law in Economy and
Society (M. Rhein
stein, ed., 1954).
Bendix, Max Weber xxiii-xxiv (1960).

5. R.

6.

7.
8.
9.

Quoted by Bendix, id. at xxi.
Rheinstein, supra n. 4 at xxxii.
M. Rheinstein, Einfuhrung in die
Rechtsvergleichung (R.
von Borries, ed., 1974).
M. Rheinstein, Gesammelte Aufsatze (H. G. Leser,
ed., to
be published early 1978).
M. Rheinstein, Die Struktur des
vertraglichen
Schuldcerhaltnisses im anglo-amerikanischen Recht
(1932).
There are 297 items in the 1968 bibliography
prepared by
Adolf Sprudzs. The work of the past nine years must
bring

the definitive bibliography close to 350 entries. Most of
the many honorary degrees, visitorships, and titles that

Max held

are listed in Duden, "Max Rheinstein: Leben
und Werk," I Ius Privatum Gentium:
Festschrift fur Max
Rheinstein 1 (E. von Caemmerer, S. Mentschikoff, and K.

Zweigert, eds., 1969).
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Max Rheinstein with

colleagues John Langbein and Gerhard Casper
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From The
Law School

KURLAND NAMED WILLIAM R.

KENAN, JR. DISTINGUISHED
SERVICE PROFESSOR

On January 1, 1977, University of
Chicago President John T. Wilson
named Philip B. Kurland the
William R. Kenan, J r. Distinguished

Service Professor.
Mr. Kurland joined the Law
School faculty in 1953. In recent
years he has taught constitutional

law, legislation, legal history, and
civil and criminal procedure in the
Law School. He has also taught
courses in law in the
College. Mr.
Kurland was named the William R.
Kenan, Jr. Professor
in 1973.

in the

College
Philip

B. Kurland

Visiting Professor at the
Georgetown Law Center and a
Visiting Scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute.
The principal fields of interest of

economics from William and

Mr. Scalia are administrative law
and constitutional law. He joined

articles editor of the law review. In

the University of Chicago Law
School faculty on July 1.

York City and in Los Angeles. Mr.
Scott was Chief Deputy Savings and

as a

EDWARD LEVI NAMED GLEN A.
LLOYD DISTINGUISHED SERVICE

PROFESSOR

Edward H. Levi returned to the

University
had been
Karl N.

on

on

January 21, 1977. He

leave of absence

as

the

Llewellyn Distinguished
Jurisprudence

Service Professor of
since he

was

1949,

an

M.A. in

Mary
political

science-international affairs

in 1953

from Princeton, and an LL. B. in
1956 from Stanford, where he was
1956-61 he

practiced

law in New

1961-63 and then served

as

General

Counsel of the Federal Home Loan

1975.

Bank Board.

Levi, who received his Ph.B
in 1932 and his J.D. in 1935 from
the University of Chicago, joined
Mr.

the

faculty in 1936. In
appointed Dean of the

1950 he

VISITING PROFESSORS: 1977-78

was

Law School.

He held this post until he became
Provost of the University in 1962.

following

in

Loan Commissioner of California in

named United States
Attorney General in February of

The

College

year Mr. Levi

became President of the University.
Upon his return to the Law

School this year Mr. Levi was
named the Glen A. Lloyd
Distinguished Service Professor. In'
the Fall Quarter he will teach
Elements of the Law to the Law

The School will have two new
Visiting Professors of Law during
the 1977-78 academic year. Gareth
Jones will return during the spring
of 1978 for the third consecutive
year. During the Winter Quarter
Samuel Brittan will be a Visiting

CLINICAL FELLOWS APPOINTED

Professor in Economics. Mr. Brittan

William S. Clark, Jr. joined the
Office of the Illinois State Appellate
Defender following his graduation

.

graduated

with first-class honors in

Economics from Jesus
Cambridge, in 1955.

For the past eleven years Mr.
Brittan has been principal economic

School's first-year students. During

commentator

the Spring Quarter Mr. Levi

Times. He

undergraduate
Jurisprudence.
an

ANTONIN SCALIA

course

JOINS

taught

in

F ACUL TY

appointed

Professor of Law. After graduating
in 1960 from Harvard Law School,
where he was Note Editor of the
law review, Mr. Scalia spent one

traveling in western and
Europe as a Sheldon Fellow
of Harvard University. He then
practiced law with the Cleveland
firm of Jones, Day, Cockley and
year

In Hj67 Mr. Scalia joined the
University of Virginia Law School
faculty. He left Virginia in 1971 to

become General Counsel of the
Office of Telecommunications

Policy. Mr. Scalia served as
Chairman of the Administrative
Conference of the United States
from 1972 to 1974. He then was

appointed Assistant Attorney
General, in charge of the Office of
Legal Counsel. In January of this
year Mr. Scalia returned to teaching

the Financial
various

Department of Economic Affairs.
was

the first winner of

the Senior Wincott Award for

financial journalists. In 1973-74 Mr.
Brittan was a Research Fellow of
Nuffield College, Oxford, and in
1974 he was elected a Visiting
Fellow of that College.
Mr. Brittan is the author of

eastern

Reavis.

on

previously held

posts with the Financial Times, as
well as with the Observer, and he
also served as adviser at the
Mr. Brittan

Antonin Scalia has been

College,

a

Two persons have been

appointed

Clinical Fellows during the past
year. Both of them are working in
the Woodlawn Community
Defender Office.

from the University of Wisconsin
Law School. Mr. Clark began
working for the Criminal Defense
Consortium of Cook County in 1976
and joined the staff of the
Woodlawn office this past winter.
Mr. Clark is a graduate of the
United States Naval Academy.

Randolph N. Stone began
working at the Woodlawn Office
during the summer. Previously Mr.
Stone had worked at the Evanston

Office of the Criminal Defense
Consorti urn of Cook County and
had been a Reginald Heber Smith
Fellow. During his fellowship he
was assigned to the Neighborhood

number of books and shorter
studies. These include Steering the

Legal Services Program in
Washington, D.C. Mr. Stone

Economy, Left or Right: The Bogus
Dilemma, Capitalism and the
Permissive Society, and a collection

received both his B.A. and his J.D.
from the University of Wisconsin.
The Woodlawn Community
Defender Office is located within a
block of the Law School. It is a
branch office of the Criminal
Defense Consortium of Cook

of essays entitled The Economic

Consequences of Democracy.
Kenneth Scott will be a Visiting
Professor during the Winter and
Spring Quarters. Mr. Scott has been
member of the Stanford Law
School faculty since 1968. His areas
of concentration are administrative
law, business associations, financial
institutions, and securities

a

regulation.
Mr. Scott received

an

A.B. in

County. The Consortium was
designed as a model clinical
program for the delivery through
neighborhood offices of legal
services to indigents charged with
crimes.

Thirty students work in this office
under the supervision of the other
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staff attorney, Robert M.

Beale Prize for excellence in the

and the office's

first-year tutorial

Axelrod,
director, Frederick
F. Cohn. Approximately 1,000
clients a year are served by this
facility.

BIGELOW TEACHING FELLOWS

The five Harry A. Bigelow Teaching
Fellows for the 1977-78 academic
year have been appointed. The

program. He

also

a winner of the Karl
Llewellyn
Memorial Cup in the Moot Court
competition. Mr. Saracino, who is a
magna cum laude graduate of
Wesleyan University, will join the
Denver law firm of Davis, Graham
& Stubbs after his year as a
Bigelow.
Jay A. Shulman is a 1977 graduate
of Northwestern University School
of Law, where he was a member of

Fellows are responsible for
designing and carrying out the legal

the editorial board of the law

research and writing program for
first-year students. Professor
Anthony T. Kronman will be the
coordinator of the program and
adviser to the Fellows this year.
Following his graduation with
honors from Melbourne University
in 1972, Chris Arup worked in an
accident law firm for one yea!" and
then was admitted to practice in

undergraduate

Australia. In 1974-76 he taught at
Monash University in Melbourne;
last year he lectured at Durham

review. Mr. Shulman did his

work at Cornell.
Michael H. Slutsky returns to the
Law School after clerking for one
year for

Justice Charles L. Levin of
Michigan Supreme Court. Mr.
Slutsky, who was an associate editor
of the law review, graduated cum

the

IN MEMORIAM

MEMORIAL FUND

IN

HONOR

OF

GEORGE BOGERT
A memorial fund in honor of George

G. Bogert has been established at
the Law School. Mr. Bogert, who
was the James Parker Hall

Professor, served

on

the

24 years. He died

faculty for

March 28,
Florida.
Persons wishing to make
memorial gifts should make them
payable to the University of
Chicago and send them to the
attention of Frank Ellsworth at the
Law School (1111 East 60th Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60637).
over

1977,

on

in

laude from the Law School in 1976.
He received his undergraduate

degree

summa cum laude in
mathematics and history from Tufts

University.

University
has

was

in England. Mr. Amp
published several articles on

RHEIN STEIN MEMORIAL

labor law.

A memorial fund in honor of Max

Upon graduating from Harvard
Law School in 1971, William V.
Luneburg worked as an

Rheinstein, who died on July
Badgastein, Austria, has been

created at the Law School. Mr.
Rheinstein joined the School's

enforcement attorney with the
United States Environmental
Protection

Agency, first in Boston
and then in Chicago. Mr. Luneburg
entered private practice in 1974
with the

Chicago law firm of
Bentley, where he
specialized in civil litigation.
Luneburg received his
undergraduate education at
Carleton College.
Tenney

&

Samuel F. Saracino is

a

Mr.

June

graduate of the University of
Chicago Law School. Mr. Saracino
was a recipient of the
Joseph Henry

9 in

Antonin Scalia

faculty in 1935. Although he had
retired from teaching in 1968,
Professor Rheinstein remained at
the Law School doing research and
writing until December 1976, when
he and his wife Lilly moved to Palo
Alto, California.
Contributions to the Max
Reinstein Memorial should be
made payable to the University of
Chicago and mailed to the
attention of Frank Ellsworth at the
Law School (1111 East 60th Street,
Chicago, Illinois 60637).
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Brief Notes from

the Faculty and Staff

Frances A. Allen, who was Visiting
Professor of Law during the
1976-77 academic year, has been
awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship
for 1978.

Robert M.

Axelrod, Staff Attorney

and Clinical Fellow

at

the

Woodlawn Office, Criminal
Defense Consortium of Cook
County, Inc., won one of the Illinois
Art Council's Annual

Literary

Awards for Poetry. Mr. Axelrod's

"Boy in
"Using
This Hallucinogenic Pepper," were
printed in the Spring 1976 issue of

award-winning

poems,

Ancient Restaurant" and

Uzzano.

During the past year Richard I.
Badger, Assistant Dean and Dean of
Students in the Law School, was
President of the National

Association for Law Placement. He
also served

on a

Task Force of the

Corporation for Legal Services to
develop a plan for assisting local

legal

services programs in

finding

and retaining staff attorneys,
managing attorneys, and paralegals.

Gerhard

Casper,

Max Pam Professor

of American and Foreign Law and
Professor of Political Science, and
Richard A. Posner, Professor of

Law, recently published their study

Richard I.

Badger

with students

of the "Workload of the Supreme
Court" as an American Bar

Foundation monograph.
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Mr. Casper and Kenneth W. Dam,
Harold J. and Marion F. Green
Professor in International Legal

Studies, participated in a
symposium of American and
German constitutional law

professors

held in Bonn on July 4,
1976, in honor of the Bicentennial.
The symposium was sponsored by
the German National Science

June 23, 1976,

Mr.

Casper

testified before the Subcommittee
on International
Security and
Scientific Affairs of the House
International Relations Committee
executive agreements.
Mr. Casper's article" Social

on

Differences and the Law"

published

Journal of Law and

School of Economics and Political
Science in December 1976. The
school's Honorary Fellows are
persons "who have attained
distinction in the arts, science or
public life, or persons who have
rendered exceptional services to the

Schoo}, or to
public life."

the arts, science

Spring Quarters of 1977 at the
Institution, Stanford
University, as a Senior Research
Fellow.
The film for which Mr. Coase
served as technical adviser last year

was

in the Fall 1976 issue of
.

Daedalus.

Ben

Rogge and Edward

G. West, "Adam Smith and the
Wealth of Nations," was awarded a
silver medal at the most recent New
York Film Festival. Production of
the film was funded by the Liberty

Fund,

Inc.

In March Mr. Coase

Ronald H. Coase, Clifton R. Musser
Professor of Economics and Editor

a

participated

debate with Nicholas Johnson,
former member of the Federal

in

a

Institute.

The second edition of

Hoover

along with

Communications Commission, on
the subject "That the FCC Should
Be Abolished." He also was
chairman of a session of a
conference on blood policy held in
the fall by the American Enterprise

or

Mr. Coase spent the Winter and

Foundation.
On

of The

Economics, was elected an
Honorary Fellow of the London

Conflict of

Laws: Cases-Comments

--Questions by Roger C. Cramton
(J.D.'55; Assistant Professor of Law,
1957-61), David P. Currie, and
Herna Hill Kay (J.D.'59) was
reviewed by Aaron D. Twerski,
Associate Dean and Professor of
Law at Hofstra University, in 61
Cornell Law Review 1045.
Mr. Twerski calls the book" a
masterful piece of work." He adds,
"Even more important than its
brilliance is the intellectual honesty
displayed by the authors in
confronting the difficult, if not

impossible, questions presented by
analysis."

interest

He notes: "The authors were, and
I believe remain, devotees of the

mode of governmental interest
analysis developed and refined by
the late Professor Brainerd Currie.
From the first page to the last, the
casebook bears the mark of his
sharp and uncompromising
questions, which penetrate and
expose the fallacies not only of
traditional doctrine, but also those
of the more modern efforts to rescue
the old doctrines by dressing them
up in more fashionable clothing.
"The authors, however," Twerski
continues, "do not reserve the

tough questions for the enemy camp
alone. With brutal honesty the
authors have exposed the
weaknesses and inconsistencies of
their adopted doctrine of interest

analysis."
Besides the

casebook, Mr. Currie
published in recent months
the following articles: "Judicial
has also

David Currie

Review under Federal Pollution
Laws" (62 Iowa Law Review 1221),
"OSHA" (1976 American Bar
Foundation Research Journal
n07), and "The Supreme Court and

Federal Jurisdiction: 1975 Term"
(1976 Supreme Court Review 183).

Stanley N. Katz, Professor of Legal
History and Associate Dean, was
appointed Chairman of the

Allison Dunham has been

General Counsel of the

appointed

University and Secretary of the
Board of Trustees. Mr. Dunham, a
member of the faculty since 1951,
will continue

University's Committee on Public
Policy Studies. He assumed this
post on July 1, 1977.
Mr. Katz has been elected to

office in

historical associations:

teaching at the Law
School. A specialist in probate and
property law and laws affecting the
growth and development of cities,

three-year term as a member of
the Executive Board, Organization

named the Arnold 1. Shure
Professor of Urban Law in 1971.

three-year term as a member,
Research Committee, American

Ralph B. Gibson, a Harry A.
Bigelow Teaching Fellow during

elected Vice-President of the

he

was

for

two

a

of American Historians, and for

Historical Association. He

the 1948-49 academic year, was
recently made a High Court Judge

England. On this appointment,
he was knighted by the Queen.
in

was on

the

faculty of the ALI-ABA Course of
Study on Financing State and Local
Government: Trends, Policies, and
Law held in Chicago on June 3-4,
1977; his presentation covered
Supreme Court and state

recent

decisions in the state tax field.
also on the faculty of the

court

He

was

was

a

also

Society for Legal History.
1976, President

American

In November

Ford appointed Mr. Katz a member
of the Permanent Committee on the
Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise; he
will

Walter Hellerstein

serve on

this committee for 8

Local/Property

Mr. Katz and
in the

Barry Karl (Professor
Department of History and

College) have received

a

planning

grant from the Ford Foundation for
a projected two-volume study:
Philanthropy and Public Policy
Formulation in the United States,
1890-1970.

Tax Course held at

the University of Indiana at

Bloomington

on

July 5-15, 1977; his

presentation covered the
constitutional law background of
state

and local taxation.

Mr. Hellerstein

was

During the month of March,
Edmund W. Kitch was a Visiting
Professor

at

the Law and Economics

Center of the University of Miami
Law School. While there Mr. Kitch

spoke

recently

at

a

workshop of the

Economics Center

on

and Function of the Patent System.
He also talked to Law School

Illinois State Bar Association.

alumni in Miami on "The State of
the Law School: 1977" and to the
Public Choice Society in New

serve on

Gareth H. Jones will be a Visiting
Professor of Law in the spring of

1978. It will be his third year on the
faculty. Mr. Jones, who in January

of 1975

was

elected into the

Orleans

on "New York City: The
Hidden Constitutional Issues."

Mr. Kitch
to

recently

the Committee

on.

was

appointed

Law and Social

Downing Professorship of the Laws

Science of the Social Science

of

Research Council.

England

became

an

at Cambridge and
Honorary Bencher of

Lincoln's Inn, will teach the second
quarter of Property.
Mr.

Jones recently completed the

second edition of The Law

of

Restitution, which he coauthored
with Robert Goff in 1966.

The citation stated: "As
commentator

label

on

without

a

ideological

the way Americans live

with their charter of government, he

has

won the applause of his
students, the respect of his
colleagues. He has written and
spoken, with uncommon effect, of
law and of religions and of

judges. And the importance of
constitutional law in today's society
has no greater champion nor more
able advocate than the person we
honor."

now so

Law and

the Nature

the Council of
appointed
the State Taxation Section of the
to

N. Katz

Stanley

years.

Tax Executives Institute State and

the Graduate School of Business of
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Torture and the Law

of Proof:
Europe and England in the Ancien
Regime will be published by the
University of Chicago Press in the
fall. This book by John H.
Langbein, Professor of Law, traces
the history of judicial torture,

showing that the system

arose

to

the needs of the medieval law
of proof and that it came to an end
when that body of law was eroded
in the judicial practice of the
serve

seventeenth and

eighteenth
Langbein shows how
law of proof, which enabled

centuries. Mr.

Philip

B.

Kurland, William

R.

a new

Kenan, J r. Distinguished Service

the

Professor, was awarded an honorary
degree by the University of Notre
Dame on May 22.

without their

courts to convict

criminals

confessions, liberated
European criminal procedure from
its dependence on torture.

c
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ILLUSTRATION

FROM

Torture and the Law

of Proof also

Torture and the Law of Proof:
and England in the Ancient

recounts the very different history
of torture in England, where the

by John

medieval jury system prevented the
law from emulating the
European law of proof.
Mr. Langbein has been on a leave
of absence from the Law School
while he is a Visiting Fellow of All
Souls College, Oxford.

Europe
Regime

H.

Langbein

common

Douglas Laycock lectured on "The
Supreme Court and Civil Rights" at
St. Xavier College in Chicago on
January 29. The lecture dealt with
the Court's racial discrimination

.

{I

decisions and emphasized the
school desegregation cases. The
lecture was part of a course on the

Supreme Court at St. Xavier.
On April 23 Mr. Laycock
participated in a seminar on the
ethical limits of the lawyer's duty of
zealous advocacy. The seminar was
part of a continuing program on
professional ethics at Calvert
House, the Catholic Student Center
adjacent to the University.
On September 7, 8, and 9 Mr.
Laycock will participate in a
seminar on Motion Practice for
Illinois trial judges.
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Douglas Laycock

Edward H. Levi, Glen A.

Distinguished

Service

Lloyd
Professor,

has been named the Herman
Phleger Visiting Professor for the

spring of 1978

by

and deliver

as

the

Phleger

a

one

public lecture

Materials and Problems was
published this summer by Little,
Brown & Company. The first
was

printed

in 1970.

Norval Morris, Dean of the Law
School and Julius Kreeger Professor

of Law and Criminology, was
named to a special subcommittee of
the Governor's Commission for
Revision of the Mental Health
Code.
an

eight-member

commission of

the Police Foundation in
Washington, D.C. The National

Advisory

courses

for

Dean Norval Morris

of

a

faculty.

United States

Department of Justice Bicentennial
Lecture at the University of
'

was

entitled

Commission

on

Higher

was

the

of ceremonies for the

master

occasion and

policemen.

In November Mr. Morris

spoke

behalf of the

on

He noted: "It took

me

the

best part of two years as dean to
discover that there is only one
Professor Puttkammer and
three. Alumni all

not

the country
in knowing terms of
over

"Punishment, Deserts and

talked

Rehabilitation." He also gave the

'Ernst'

Soper Lecture in March at the
University of Maryland.
Dean Morris', latest book, Letters
to the President on Crime Control,

'Putty.' Their correspondence
compounded the confusion.

which he wrote with Gordon

formidable role this much-named

Hawkins, was published in January
by the University of Chicago Press.

man

to

me

or

of 'Wilfred'

or

of 'Putt'

Ultimately, putting the three
together, I came to realize what
has

played

or

a

in the life of the

School-and in what

warm

regard he is held by
by his colleagues."

our

and

high

alumni and

Dean Morris added: "Criminal
A dinner

honoring their most senior
colleague was given by the faculty
on May 24, 1977, for Professor

law is, of course, Wilfred's field. As
a scholar and commentator he was
years ahead of the

Emeritus Ernst W. Puttkammer and

need for incl usion of the work of the

his

wife, Helen. Among the guests
their daughter Lorna and her

were

Dean Morris has also been named
to

college

Denver. His address

Professor.

The second edition of Bernard
Meltzer's Labor Law: Cases,

edition

examine the purpose and future

delivered

Stanford

University. Mr. Levi will teach
course

Education for Police Officers will

husband Francis Straus II, both

members of the University faculty,
their son Charles and his wife

Cordelia, and their grandchildren,
Francis Straus III and Helen Straus.

pack, seeing the

police and of the administration of
the criminal law in the scholarly
range of the criminal lawyer-an
insight still far from common and
still grossly neglected." He then
read a letter sent by James
Rochford, Chicago's

Superintendent

of

Police, for the

occasion.
Ernest
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Samuels, J.D.'26,

Professor Emeritus of English

at

Northwestern University, spoke on
behalf of Professor Puttkammer's

nature taught us to discriminate and
distinguish and, so to speak, to
proceed on all fours. It was a
in logic and evidence that
proved invaluable to me when I
later embarked on literary

training

students. Mr. Samuels said: "All
ever knew about criminal law
I learned in his class
perhaps eked
out by a Hornbook. I recall those
wonderful contests in the

been

classroom,

bringing

that I

when

primed

with

our

five or so cases, we matched wits
with Professor Puttkammer, who
with unfailing courtesy and
good

Helen and Ernst W. Puttkammer

at

a

research."
Mr. Samuels, whose career as
scholar, teacher, commentator, and
biographer of Henry Adams has
a most

distinguished

one,

him many academic
honors and prizes including the

Pulitzer Prize, concluded his
remarks by saying: "[Professor

recent Law

School

function

Puttkammer] has helped ensure that
the crooked shall always be seen to
be crooked and the
straight,
straight, that innocence and guilt
shall be humanely discriminated
and law and order be terms of
praise
and not of reproach."
The evening's other speaker was
Li vingston Hall, son of
James
Parker Hall, who was the dean who
persuaded Mr. Puttkammer to join
the Law School faculty, in 1920.

James B. White
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In

August James B. White directed a
practicing lawyers and

seminar for

judges

at

the Law School. Seminar

participants examined the

nature

of

argument about matters of public
value. They studied the literature of

Greece, eighteenth-century

ancient

England and

America and drew

connections to the ways in which

modern lawyers and judges
function as users and makers of
public language. The one-month
seminar was sponsored by the
National Endowment for the
Humanities.
Mr. White addressed

faculty

a

Yale

seminar in November. The

paper which he

occasion

was

delivered on this
"Cultures of

Argument."
A casebook

by

Mr.

White,

Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
which he coauthored with James E.

Scarboro, was recently published
by Foundation Press.

On March

18, 1977, Hans Zeisel
addressed the Fifteenth Annual
Institute on Patent Law of the
Southwestern Legal Foundation on
"Survey Evidence in Trademark
Cases." Mr. Zeisel, Professor
Emeritus of Law' and Sociology, was
elected a Fellow of the American
Statistical Association in the spring.

Franklin E.

Zimring, Professor of

Law and Director of the Center for

Studies in Criminal Justice, is
as rapporteur for the 20th

serving

Century Fund Task Force on
Sentencing the Young Offender.
In March Mr. Zimring received a
Distinguished Alumni Award for
1977 from Delta Sigma Rho-Tau
Kappa Alpha. He was selected as a
recipient for his scholarly
contributions to the law, especially
in the areas of gun control and
deterrence in crime control.

Mr.

Zimring

the ten

was

named

outstanding

as one

of

teachers who

shape the future in the March 14,
1977, issue of Time. The article on
him noted that: "Zimring prefers
the classroom, where he walks a
tightrope between 'bullying and
pushing benignly,' always wary, he
says, 'of infecting students with my
Hans Zeisel

biases."

"

CAMPAIGN FOR BOOKS
In the fall of 1976 the Law School launched

a

Campaign for Books for the Law Library. This
unique appeal to the libraries, rather than pock

etbooks, of the

Law School's

graduates

was

based upon the Law Library's needs for funds
and the opportunity some graduates might see
for the

disposition

of the less used portions of
Campaign has

their collections. To date the

been very successful. Many volumes have been
added to the Law Library's collection which

might otherwise have had
few volumes of

to

be

purchased.

A

books have been received.
These might otherwise not have been available
at all.

By far the

paign

is the

rare

most

ability

important part of the Cam
to

exchange the

many items

needed by the Law Library for new books
needed in the collection. This portion of the

not

Campaign functions almost like the addition of
book fund for the Law Library and has
been very helpful in getting it through another
year of severe financial stringency.
a new

by the initial success of this Cam
paign,
appeal is planned for this fall. In
the meantime anyone wishing to donate books
to the Law Library should contact: Richard L.
Bowler, University of Chicago Law Library,
1121 East 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637
(312-753-3421).
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a new
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